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ABSTRACT
The Hypothesis of this study is that the United States and Japan
have important and complementary roles to play in contributing to
the peace and stability in Southeast Asia in spite of the end of
the Cold War. Historical perspectives with regard to Southeast
Asia since the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam until
the end of the Cold War are provided as the foundations for change.
The national development of the nations of Southeast Asia, the
implications of the rapid economic growth of China, and the
military buildup in the region since the end of the Cold War are
examined. Similarly, the rising transnational problems of
Southeast Asia including piracy, drug abuse, a burgeoning
population and environmental issues are addressed. The basic
changes in American policies toward the region, including the
implications of the withdrawal from the military facilities in the
Philippines, and the impact of the reductions in the military
budget are examined. Likewise, basic Japanese policies toward
Southeast Asia, particularly in light of recent dramatic changes in
Japanese internal politics, the effects of the Persian Gulf War,
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EXECUTIVE SUIU¥Y
Despite the end of the Cold War, four of the world's five
remaining communist run nations are in Asia. There remain a
number of dormant issues and disputes which could escalate
into hostilities. Potential crises include a new Korean war
or North Korean launch of nuclear missiles; armed conflict
between China and Taiwan; battles over claims to the oil-rich
Spratly Islands, particularly between China and Vietnam; Civil
War in an Asian nation, such as the Philippines; or a conflict
between Japan and Russia over the Kurile Islands. From
boardrooms to warrooms, the region is probing for a new
stability after the Cold War's demise and Communism's
decline.
The United States was the major provider for security in
Southeast Asia during the final years of the Cold War.
Members of ASEAN viewed the U.S. military presence as the best
hope for preventing war. After the U.S. withdrawal from
Vietnam through the last years of the Carter administration,
there was a fear of U.S. abandonment of the region. The
implications of "No More Vietnams" and the Nixon Doctrine,
stipulating nations in the region assume a greater share of
their security burden, were rather intimidating. Human rights
became a front line issue, as it had never before. Later,
President Reagan restored regional confidence in America
through a stronger U.S. defense posture and a hard-line
foreign policy in the face of continued Soviet expansion in
vi
the region, but at a high premium. Reagan used deficit
spending to finance the defense build up, which attributed to
the growing Asian perception of a United States in decline.
During the Reagan years ASEAN was one of the "six pillars" in
the U.S. policy in Asia symbolizing the U.S. commitment to
remain a Pacific power. Under U.S. pressure, Japan extended
its maritime defense zone from 200 nautical miles to 1,000
nautical miles and within 200 nautical miles of the
Philippines. Despite the controversies between the United
States and Japan, including the Toshiba debacle and the FSX
controversy, Japan was the chief supporter of U.S. policy in
Southeast Asia. The end of the Cold War brought about many
changes to Southeast Asia. One of the growing concerns is
China's economic success, which has allowed increased military
expenditures. Specifically, mainland China is placing a
greater emphasis on preparation for regional conflict.
Southeast Asia is one of the world's most economically
energetic and successful regions. Both the United States and
Japan have played key roles in the region's successes. With
the growing needs of national development in the region, the
technology and markets of Japan and the United States and
possibly greater China more important than ever.
The end of the Cold War produced dramatic cuts in military
spending in Europe and the United States, but it prompted new
uncertainty and anxiety in Southeast Asia, and set off an
accelerating arms races with significant implications for
vii
regional and international security. The economic means are
increasingly available to support the regional arms race;
regional trends in arms procurement from foreign sources and
domestic production are increasing; and the stimulus of inter
and extra regional pressures favoring arms build up are
intact. Modernization and naval strength characterize the
build up.
With the dramatic reductions in American armed forces both
at home and overseas, combined with an alarming number of
potential regional hot spots and increasing economic ties to
Southeast Asia, the responsibilities of the United States are
more difficult to meet. American policy makers must make a
continuous reappraisal of Southeast Asia. Finally, the United
States and Japan are vital to the welfare of Southeast Asia
and the peace of the Pacific. The Japanese will not presume
to displace America or fill any vacuum that might occur
following decreased American participation; but will insure a




Southeast Asia in one of six major regions of the Asian
continent. Other regions include South, Southwest, East Asia,
Central Asia and Siberian Russia. Southeast Asia includes ten
independent states: Brunei, Burma, Cambodia (Kampuchia),
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam. Burma, Thailand, and Indochina -
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia - make up continental Southeast
Asia; Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, and the Philippines
comprise maritime Southeast Asia. Malaysia stretches from its
continental core, extending into the South China Sea in
Sarawak, over to Sabah in Borneo (Kalimantan).[Ref. 1]
In the Western Pacific the sea-lanes through Southeast
Asia are crucial for maritime traffic passing from the Middle
East to East Asia. It is also important, though not as much
so, for shipping back and forth between the United States and
the Middle East. The Japanese import virtually all of their
crude oil, iron ore, and food grains(Ref. 2]. Japan,
the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China on Taiwan
import approximately 80 percent of their crude oil from the
Persian Gulf. All three nations are export oriented and &re
resource dependent. The majority of their imports,
particularly oil, come through the straits in Southeast Asia.
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There are four major straits allowing maritime passage
between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. They
include the Strait of Malacca, between peninsular Malaysia and
the Indonesian island of Sumatra; the Sunda Strait, solely in
Indonesian territorial waters between Sumatra and Java; the
Lombok Strait, adjacent to Lombok Island and also controlled
by Indonesia; and the Ombai Strait between Java and
Timor(Ref. 3]. Due to the constrictive nature of all
of these waterways, each can be categorized as a "choke point"
- relatively easily interdicted or controlled.
For peacetime shipping, any obstruction to passage in
these Southeast Asian straits would mean diverting to other
longer routes. This in turn would do little more than
marginally increase the market costs of commodities. In a
hostile situation, however, any interdiction of traffic would
involve not only increased, and possibly disabling response
time to crises, but would impair the survival capacity of the
economies of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan - neither of which
could long endure without imported resources.(Ref. 1: p. 9]
Sitting at the crossroads of two oceans, the region's
geography is its destiny.
It is difficult in Southeast Asia to envissage the new
balance of power if the U.S. were to withdraw from the
region. Many now recognize that if the U.S. leaves the region,
there would be a growing threat from both Japan and China.
Currently, Japan is perceived as a theoretical threat. Its
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military is constrained by a war renouncing constitution and
a dependence upon U.S. forces under a security treaty. The
Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) numbers only 180,000
soldiers, and that number is getting smaller. Moreover,
Japan's prime minister, Morihiro Hosokawa, wants his country
to lead the world in disarmament. What worries Japan's
Southeast Asian neighbors, however, is that Japan possesses
the technology to develop powerful weapons, including nuclear
bombs, quickly. Compounding their fears is the thought of
Japan leaving the American security umbrella.[Ref. 4]
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE
Southeast Asians appreciate the importance of their
strategic location. In the past they were conquered by aliens
from over the sea, and now all their connections with the
outside world depend upon the freedom of the seas. Their
security depends upon not only upon their own ability to
defend themselves but also upon an absence of any hostile
threat from the navies of the great powers.
One of the most significant obstacles to the security of
Southeast Asia is the diversity of the region. The disparity
between ethnicities, religions, cultures and languages makes
it unusually difficult to build the consensus necessary for a
successful security policy. Nowhere was this divisiveness
better exemplified than in 1976 when the United States
withdrew from Vietnam. The perceptions of the Southeast Asian
nations toward the three great powers vying for dominance in
the region - the United States (with Japan in the background),
the Soviet Union, and China - were at a critical juncture, as
the tremendous influence of the United States in the region
appeared to be ebbing.
Neither the United States, the Peoples Republic of China,
nor the Soviet Union could be indifferent to the fate of
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Southeast Asia. Each had major investments there. But the
withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam represented a new
opportunity for the Soviet Union.
For years the Soviet Union had been trying to close the
gap between the capabilities of its armed forces and those of
the United States. By 1976 it appeared that they had gained
the advantage. For the first time the Soviets deployed more
intercontinental ballistic missiles than the United States -
1,118 for the U.S.S.R. versus 1,054 for the United States.
In a comparison of naval surface combatants, the Soviets
likewise had the numerical edge with 225 vessels to 175 for
the U.S. With aircraft inventories, the Soviet Air Command
registered more than 6,000 in service, while the United States
Air Force listed 5,000.[Ref. 5] The Soviet military
build up became increasingly more disconcerting to the United
States and its security partners. The pattern revealed in the
comparison of defense spending between the Soviets and the
U.S. was of particular concern. According to some American
sources,[Ref. 5] by 1977 the defense budget of the Soviet
Union was more than forty percent greater than that of the
United States - the Soviets were building up, while the U.S.
was in a draw down following the Vietnam conflict.
This Soviet build up was indicative of a dramatic change
compared to their previous one-dimensional strategy prevalent
one decade before. During the 1960s the Soviet strategy had
been based on nuclear strategic rocket forces, primarily
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designed to deal with European conflicts where ground forces
would follow nuclear strikes.[Ref. 6] The
inflexibility of this one-dimensional strategy left few
alternatives to nuclear conflict. With the policy changes
after the 1960s, however, the Soviets seemed willing to use
their growing conventional armed forces without warning to
further their political and security interests. Examples
included Soviet assistance to the "people's revolutionary
forces" in South Yemen against the Royal Yemeni Military
Command; again in support of Moammar Khadafy in his coup
against Libya's King Idris in 1969; the conflict with the
Chinese on the Amur River in the same year; and further in
assistance of the Egyptians against the Israelis in 1973. The
most blatant example of the Soviet propensity to exercise its
raw military power, however, came in 1979 with the invasion of
Afghanistan.[Ref. 1: pp. 34-35]. No one worried about the
costs the Soviets paid for these policies.
After the fall of Saigon the apparent gains of the
Soviet Union in the region were substantial. In 1978 the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam became a member of the Soviet-
sponsored Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).
This in turn was followed by a series of bilateral agreements
that culminated in a treaty of friendship and cooperation
signed on 3 November 1978. The treaty committed Vietnam to
"support the struggle waged by the nonaligned countries and
the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against
6
imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism."[Ref. 7]
Later, the association of Laos and Cambodia with the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam gave the treaty the image of a
regional organization(Ref. 7]. More importantly, the Soviets
gained access to the naval and air facilities at Da Nang and
Cam Ranh Bay.
Southeast Asians witnessed first hand Soviet hegemonism in
the region with the newly accessible facilities in Vietnam.
Through the Cold War the Soviets spent well over the
equivalent of two billion U.S. dollars per year on the
facilities at Cam Rahn Bay and Da Nang[Ref. 8]. The
bases became the largest, most sophisticated and best equipped
Soviet facilities outside the U.S.S.R. Their strategic
locations were adjacent to some of the most impc'- - -nt and most
susceptible sea-lanes in the world. With access to Vietnam,
the Soviets sought to guarantee maritime passage for their
merchant ships between Vladivostok in the Pacific and Black
Sea; the containment of China, and to counteract the United
States position in the region. The tremendous costs of these
initiatives might well have served as warnings of troubles
ahead.
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina had
significant security implications to the region. When South
Vietnam collapsed, it set in motion a chain of events which
soon dramatically altered the security policies of the third
major power in Southeast Asia - the Peoples Republic of China.
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In 1976, the Asian members of the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization (SEATO) - established under the leadership of the
United States in order to "contain" the Chinese communists -
considered the termination of that organization. In place of
the formal collective defense approach, most Asian states,
including the PRC and Japan, explored the concept of an ASEAN
and ultimately a Southeast Asian Zone for Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) devoid of Great Power presence but backed
by their collective guarantees.
Then, in 1978 the Vietnamese, backed by the Soviet Union,
invaded Chinese-supported Cambodia. The invasion posed a
significant security risk to the Chinese because Vietnam
maintained an enormous standing army, third largest in the
world behind the Soviet Union and China. For one month in
1979 the confrontation blossomed into a shooting war, which
ended inconclusively, but was indicative of the Chinese
sentiment toward the Soviet oriented states of the region.
Also significant was the dramatic change in the Chinese
relationship with their noncommunist neighbors. Prior to the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Chinese focus was on
supporting subversive activities designed to undermine the
noncommunist governments. Thereafter, for the remainder of
the Cold War, the Chinese for their own reasons significantly
limited their people to people activities in support of
insurgency.[Ref. 9]
8
In 1976 the complexities of the strategic environment of
the region began to emerge. Basically, the nations of
Southeast Asia divided themselves into two groups. The
Indochinese states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were backed
by the Soviet Union, while the ASEAN states of Thailand,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines identified
with the United States. Southeast Asia was completely
enmeshed in the Cold War.
At the time of the inception of ASEAN, when the
comparative weakness of the United States became apparent,
many of the leaders recognized the inherent danger of strong
military alignment with the United States. Military ties
could expose them to hostile judgments and military
initiatives of both Moscow and Beijing. In an effort to
disarm objections from either source, the ASEAN founders
stipulated that their organization would not be a military
alliance against anyone but would concentrate primarily on
economic, social, and cultural cooperation. Furthermore, the
associated states committed themselves to the notion that the
region would become a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality,
free from any form or manner of interference by outside
powers."[Ref. 10] By 1976, the United States had
withdrawn from Vietnam, which resulted from Communist
victories in Indochina. From a regional perspective the U.S.
military might was waning. On the other hand, there seemed to
be no stopping the expansion of the Soviet military influence.
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Yet, there was a sharp distinction between the security
policies both of Indochina and ASEAN, with further distinction
in the policies of the individual nation-states.
For better or for worse, the Vietnamese became bedfellows
with the Soviet Union. Their reasons for doing so were not
complicated. Vietnamese nationals were starving from extreme
food shortages. The government in Hanoi recognized that
without Soviet assistance an uprising was inevitable. The
U.S.S.R. not only supplemented food supplies, but provided
Vietnam with all of its defense needs, including not only
weapons, but petroleum.[Ref. 11]
Despite the threat of invasion by the Chinese, the
unexpected difficulties in Cambodia, and the challenges
presented by ASEAN, the greatest threat to Vietnam after the
U.S. withdrawl may have been internal. After the war with the
United States, the country began a socioeconomic decline that
continued for years. At the heart of the problem was the
Vietnamese government. The fifteen man Vietnamese Politburo
came of age through years of warfighting with external powers.
They were determined and of a single mind set in long wars
against well equipped, formidable enemies - and they were
victorious. With military victory the members of the
Politburo gained confidence in their leadership abilities, and
secured their positions politically. As so often in history,
however, the war time leadership was ill prepared to manage
the transition from the austerity of war to a healthy,
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competitive economy. Consequently, the Vietnamese economy
worsened to the point of stagnation. Economic and military
assistance from the Soviet Union became an indispensable
crutch, upon which the Politburo became more and more
dependent. Counterrevolution was not the solution to the
subsequent economic privation for the ordinary Vietnamese, as
it might have been for the citizens of any other nation.
Instead, the Vietnamese evaded or manipulated the constraining
socialist system. Consequently, the incompetent Politburo
remained in power, and as a result, the Vietnamese were
compelled to witness the explosive economic success of their
ASEAN neighbors from the sidelines. Since their neighbors,
Cambodia and Laos, were deep in their internal problems,
Vietnam was the only Indochinese state with the energy and the
means to think about its security problems.
To the leadership in Hanoi the struggle with ASEAN was
symbolic of the great global struggle between the forces of
progress (socialism) and reaction (capitalism). The
Vietnamese government maintained its belief that the societies
of ASEAN were neither legitimate or durable. Sooner or later
they would be consumed by the omnipotent force of the people's
republic. [Ref. 11: p. 187] Hanoi wanted to help in the
demise of ASEAN, but was constrained by its own socioeconomic
dilemma. Nevertheless, the systems of ASEAN remained the
ideological enemies of Indochina throughout the Cold War.
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The problems in Cambodia transcended the Cold War. Out
from 1976 until the demise of the Soviet Union, Cambodia
represented a focal point for instability. At the end of 1978
the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in order to subdue the threat
represented by Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge. The Vietnamese
expected an easy victory. Hanoi anticipated military victory
in less than six months. The Vietnamese leadership was in for
a surprise.
The Soviet trained and equipped People's Army of Vietnam
(PAVN) seemingly forgot the hard lessons they had learned from
combat with the French and Americans. In an ironic twist, the
PAVN adopted a warfighting technique similar to that employed
by the unsuccessful U.S. forces in Vietnam three years
earlier. Pol Pot, on the other hand, adopted the guerilla
type warfare used so successfully by the Viet Cong against the
Americans. The long war which ensued was a testament to the
incompetence of the Vietnamese Politburo and military
leadership.[Ref. 11: p. 181] During the Cold War the
continuing Vietnamese (oncern was whether to install and
support a federation in Indochina, or hammer out a negotiated
settlement over Cambodia and Laos. The Khmers were never
completely subdued, and hostilities continued for over
fourteen years[Ref. 12]. Without their patron,
however, the Vietnamese could never have lasted in Cambodia as
long as they did.
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Thailand, the largest state in mainland Southeast Asia,
was the ASEAN state closest to the Vietnamese threat. There
was no love lost between the two nations. During the Vietnam
War, protracted American bombing raids against the Viet Cong
were launched from airfields at Udon Thani and U Thapao.
Moreover, Thailand owed its rapid economic growth in the 1960s
to enormous U.S. military expenditures. In the "domino
theory," Thailand was perceived to be the next to fall to the
Soviet supported Vietnamese after Cambodia. But Thailand,
more than any other nation in Southeast Asia, had a history of
omnidirectionalism. Any study of the national history
corroborates the age old theory that Thais are flexible
people. Through the colonial era in continental Asia, for
example, Thailand managed to play the great colonial powers on
every border against each other, thereby maintaining Thai
sovereignty. Sukhumband Paribatra of the Institute of
Strategic Studies in Bangkok aptly stated that "when the chips
are down, the Thais want to be standing next to the one with
the biggest pile of chips" [Ref 11: p. 217]. Accordingly, the
Thais preferred an arrangement with the Vietnamese that would
keep Cambodia a buffer state. True to form, during the Cold
War, the Thais concentrated on their own development and well
being, regardless of the consequences to their alliance with
ASEAN or their support for the ZOPFAN. They sought to balance
their interests with everyone in the region, including the
Vietnamese, Soviets and Chinese. In the eyes of the Thais,
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however, the United States maintained the upper hand in the
Cold War, and therefore was best able to help them maintain
their desired goal of sustained economic growth.
Indonesian foreign and security policies during the Cold
War were the children of nationalism and colonialism, fostered
during their war of Independence (1945-1949). Despite
tremendous pressure from outside influences, the Indonesians
remained committed to a free and active foreign policy for the
duration of the Cold War. They could not commit themselves
either to the United States or the Soviet Union.
During the Cold War the Indonesians remained non-aligned,
but not neutral. Their non-aligned position was not solely a
consequence of noble ideological pursuits, but was a pragmatic
judgment of the most effective way to deal with the great
powers.
The Indonesian drift away from the West after their
independence was accelerated by two disputes with the United
States. First, Indonesia recognized only one China, with
Beijing as the sole legitimate government. The U.S. refused
to recognize the PRC, and supported the government of Chiang
Kai-shek in Taiwan. In an attempt to contain the PRC, the
United States attempted to mobilize the PRC's Southeast Asian
neighbors in a containment policy, which resulted in the
genesis of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).
Indonesia consistently refused to join SEATO, which eventually
dissolved after President Nixon normalized relations with the
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PRC. The wide ranging attitudes of the U.S. toward the PRC
served to bolster the Indonesian nonaligned position. Second,
relations with the U.S. deteriorated over the issue of the
Indonesian annexation of West Irian, which was eventually
unified with the republic in 1963. The United States was
reluctant to support Indonesia's claim to West Irian, which
was a "national objective" of the Indonesian government.
Indonesians had the least in common with the communist
powers. With a population of over ninety percent Moslem, they
thought of godless Marxism as an alien ideology.[Ref. 11: p.
192] Gradually they began to tilt toward the United States.
They believed that "communist" insurgency was one of their
greatest threats. On 30 September 1965 Chinese communist
supporters in the Indonesian army attempted a coup. Six of
the Indonesian army's top generals were assassinated.
Political order was restored by the current president, General
Soeharto, who promptly reestablished Indonesia's standing in
the eyes of the West. By the late 1960s Indonesia had cut
diplomatic relations with Beijing (restored only in 1990), had
rejoined the UN, and had participated as a founding member of
ASEAN. The New Order of President Soeharto brought about the
concept of a dual function of the army, whereby military
leaders assumed political appointments in addition to
traditional military roles: army officers took charge of
government ministries and became directors of government
agencies. Soeharto also installed a powerful group of
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American-educated economists - the Berkeley Mafia - to replace
revolutionary political ideology with modern western economic
practices. Unlike their communist neighbors, Indonesians
experienced a era of unprecedented political stability and a
firm foundation for economic growth(Ref. 2: pp. 48-49].
Through their observations and experiences with the great
powers during the Cold War, Indonesians came to the conclusion
that they need not count heavily on any outside power for
support. This attitude was in turn reflected in their belief
in the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.
Malaysia is very close to Indonesia in language and
religion and throughout the Cold War followed many of the same
international security policies. One of the significant
differences was that Malaysia, with Singapore, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, participated in a five-
power defense arrangement and in an integrated air defense
system. Like Indonesia, Malaysia accepted the ZOPFAN ideal,
but forged closer military ties with the United States
(Malaysia sponsored a U.S. air and naval presence) - the
result of the Soviet backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.
However, the vast commercial potential in the abundance of
Malaysian natural resources including rubber, tin and palm oil
far outweighed the desire for closer military ties with the
United States as a factor in shaping foreign policy.[Ref 11:
p. 177] Like Indonesia, however, one of the greatest dangers
to Malaysian national security was communist insurgency. In
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one method of dealing with the problem, Prime Minister Datuk
Seri Mahatir Mohamad invoked the Internal Security Act (ISA)
in 1981, which enabled him to detain his opponents without
trial. He applied the ISA liberally and emasculated his
opposition. Internally, the threat came from a political
system which institutionalized racism. The main political
organization featured three traditional political parties: the
dominant United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian
Congress (MIC) formed by the minority ethnic Tamils.[Ref. 2:
pp. 228-229] On more than one occasion the tension exploded
in violent riots. Like Indonesia, Malaysian national security
priorities during the Cold War were the promotion of economic
development and the prevention of insurgencies. Ultimately,
the Malaysians committed themselves for their security to the
Indonesians who shared their language, religion and most of
their cultural background.
At the tip of the Malay Peninsula, the city-state of
Singapore maintained a strong anti-communist posture
throughout the duration of the Cold War. Due to its size, the
Singaporean government, headed by Lee Kuan Yew, maintained
that a multilateral front afforded the best security. As with
Thailand and Malaysia, Singapore -ecognized the Vietnamese
threat as preeminent, but contrary to Thailand sought to
galvanize world opinion against it. Singapore, as the most
pragmatic state in existence, and completely dependent for its
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prosperity on its capitalist system, identified itself without
reservation as being on the side of the United States.
Of all the nations in Southeast Asia, the Philippines was
closest to the United States with regard to regional security
during the period between the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and
the end of the Cold War. The treaty of mutual defense and the
U.S. use of Philippine bases became the linchpin for American
commitment to the region.
The differences between the Filipinos and the Americans,
however, were most evident in negotiations over the military
bases. The basic agreement of 1947 underwent a number of
revisions. These most often resulted in the relinquishment of
certain facilities or property by the U.S. to the Philippines.
Eventually, the original term of the leases was shortened from
2040 to 1991. In one significant revision, the use of the
bases for U.S. military combat operations became subject to
prior consultation of the Philippine government. Filipino
opposition to American terms made it impossible to use Clark
Air Force Base for bombing missions against Vietnam during the
War.
Between 1979 and 1988, later amendments to the agreement
caused the greatest controversy. During those years the
Philippines accused the United States of reneging on financial
pledges. Consequently, the Philippine government demanded
much larger amounts of financial compensation than the U.S.
was willing to provide.[Ref. 13] To the Filipino
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opponents of the bases agreement, the bases infringed on
Philippine sovereignty. Moreover, in the event of a nuclear
war it was much more likely that the Philippine bases would be
lightning rods rather than providing protection.
In June 1991, Mt. Pinatubo, a volcano dormant for over six
centuries, erupted. Several feet of ash fell on both Clark
and Subic. The damage was significant, and the Pentagon
ordered a total evacuation of Americans from Clark, and an
evacuation of dependents and nonessential U.S. civilian
workers from Subic. Negotiations between Washington and
Manila over the bases were put on hold, as the Pentagon and
the Bush administration assessed the cost of the physical
damage, the future stability of Mt. Pinatubo, and whether
there needed to be a change in the American negotiating
position. The cost to repair the damage, the end of the Cold
War, and the potential for further eruptions weighted against
the reestablishment of Clark, and the Bush administration
concluded that the Air Base was no longer feasible.[Ref. 13:
p. 127]
When the controversial points over Subic later turned out
to be unsolvable, the Americans withdrew from the Naval Base
in November, 1992.[Ref. 11: pp. 178, 228] In many ways, this
was a serious blow to all the states that depended on the
United States for regional security.
The bases played important roles in supporting the U.S.
military presence not only in Southeast Asia, but the entire
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Pacific basin, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. They
were vital to several U.S. force buildups in those regions.
From a Filipino perspective, after 1986 they sometimes played
a direct role in the U.S. support for democratic political
development in the Philippines - most notably in support of
the Aquino government during the attempted coup in 1989.
B. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The interests of the United States in post World War II
Southeast Asia have been best served through peace and
stability in the region. For American policy makers after the
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, peace and stability required
that the noncommunist economic systems of Northeast Asia,
notably Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan remained
healthy and dynamic. Any threat to the flow of trade to those
nations would have been disastrous. Strategically, the U.S.
allies in Northeast Asia were as important to America as Great
Britain was to the Allies in World War II. In a time of
crisis defense of the entire region would have been difficult,
if not impossible, without them. Economic resupply was a
priority, and therefore the security of the sea lanes through
Southeast Asia was vital.
As long as the Cold War continued, the United States and
its security partners would have been seriously disadvantaged
if the nations of Southeast Asia had either begun to assume
anti-U.S. or anti-Western attitudes or would have succumbed to
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the influence of an enemy of the United States. The best
defense against such a threat was to develop more mutually
beneficial relations with those Southeast Asian nations with
whom the United States shared political, economic and
security interests. U.S. policy makers were convinced that
nations with "democratic" ideals and progressive market based
economies featured more civil and political rights for their
peoples which in turn made instability unlikely. Such nations
also tended to be favorably disposed to the United States and
the West.[Ref. 1: p. 29]
America's foremost policy toward Southeast Asia was issued
at the height of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and survived the
conflict largely intact. Entitled the Nixon Doctrine, it
outlined three axioms directed primarily toward Southeast
Asia: first, The United States would keep all of its treaty
commitments; second, the U.S. would provide a shield against
any nuclear power which threatened the freedom of a nation
allied with America, threatened a nation whose survival was
considered vital to American security, or threatened the
security of the region as a whole; and finally, in cases
involving other types of aggression, the United States would
furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as
appropriate - but the nation directly threatened was to assume
the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its
own defense.[Ref. 14]
21
As the years passed, however, the American government, the
executive branch in particular, experienced grave difficulties
in maintaining a reasonably consistent policy. U.S. policy
after the American departure from Vietnam was in considerable
turmoil. Richard Nixon had recently resigned as a result of
the Watergate scandal, and former vice-president Ford was in
office. President Ford was under pressure from several
quarters.
In Vietnam, things were going badly and in the Spring of
1975 President Ford was obliged to watch with frustration as
North Vietnam at last overran South Vietnam, leaving American
credibility badly damaged - in all of Southeast Asia[Ref. 15].
The credibility of the office of the president was now in
question. Limitations were imposed on the president's freedom
to use military force by the War Powers Act. Laws were passed
requiring countries that received U.S. economic or military
assistance to meet certain minimum human rights standards
domestically, which evolved into an annual report of human
rights violations in all countries. Additionally, Congress
enacted numerous "legislative vetoes" which required the
president to provide it with notice of proposed arms
deliveries and allowing it to veto such actions[Ref. 13: p.
20]. The first major shift in policy after the Vietnam War
with regards to Southeast Asia came with the Carter
administration.
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During his time in office President Carter seemed
determined to shift the U.S. policy even further toward human
rights and morality and away from military and strategic
advantages over the Soviet Union[Ref. 16]. President
Carter's tendency to be soft on the Soviets did little to
deter a continued Soviet build of strategic military
power(Ref. 17]. Furthermore, Carter was beset by a
combination of other international crises: the Iranian
revolution and the ensuing hostage crisis, the second oil
shock, and in 1979 the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
During the Carter years Southeast Asia shifted to the
periphery of U.S. foreign policy. The region was indirectly
affected, however, by America's Cold War strategy elsewhere in
Asia. In 1975 President Carter issued a statement that the
United States should withdraw its ground troops from South
Korea over the next several years. Carter had been critical
of the Republic of Korea for its suppression of human rights,
and the "Koreagate" scandal involving alleged Korean gifts of
money to U.S. members of Congress in an attempt to secure
continued U.S. support of South Korea's military security had
generated widespread criticism of Seoul.[Ref. 18]
Most leaders of the ASEAN states and Japan expressed concern
over what they perceived as further American retreat from
Asia. Furthermore, they believed that President Carter was
acting unilaterally on an issue of vital concern throughout
Asia[Ref 13: p. 22].
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In another significant Asian policy decision, the U.S. and
PRC announced on 15 December 1978 their agreement to establish
full diplomatic relations on the first day of January,
1979[Ref. 16: p. 197]. The agreement only added fuel to
President Carter's growing opposition within America.
President Reagan was elected to office in 1980 and
dramatically changed the United States' relationship with the
nations of Southeast Asia. President Reagan attacked
President Carter's position on human rights during his
campaign, and true to his word altered the U.S. position on
the issue. Reagan believed that the issue of human rights was
applied too strongly against U.S. allies. The new president
outlined his commitment to Asia early in his administration.
In March 1982 Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger described
U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific as a "six-pillar
edifice"[Ref. 19] - the nations of ASEAN being one of the
"pillars." The policy firmly established the determination
of the United States to remain a Pacific power, thereby
answering questions over a U.S. withdrawal raised during the
Carter administration. President Reagan furthermore pressed
for a stronger foreign policy and U.S. defense in response to
Soviet presence in the world. A surprising sense of
bipartisanship emerged between the predominantly Democratic
House of Representatives, and the Republican controlled
Senate.
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During President Reagan's administration Japan became the
chief supporter of U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia, and a
rapidly growing participant in Southeast Asian development.
As Japan flourished economically, President Reagan expressed
a different attitude toward the Japanese than did his
predecessor. Instead of publicly criticizing Japan for not
spending enough on defense in relation to its Gross National
Product, President Reagan focused on more appropriate roles
for the Japanese Self Defense Forces in conjunction with their
U.S. counterparts. In 1981 the Japanese government, with the
dynamic leadership of Prime Minister Nakasone, accepted the
primary responsibility for its own air defense and sea lanes
out to 1,000 nautical miles to the east and south of Japan.
The Japanese increased defense spending little by little with
the consent of the United States. The security relationship
between the two nations became stronger, which in turn
affected U.S. relations with another great power with vital
interests in Southeast Asia.
As the Japanese assumed a greater role in their own
defense and that of the region, policy makers neglected the
role of the PRC. With the growing American military strength
and changing views of the "evil empire," the fear of China
diminished[Ref. 13: p. 24]. The same could not be said for
the Soviet opinion of the PRC.
As Soviet troubles mounted, Party Secretary-General
Mikhail Gorbachev of the U.S.S.R. sought better relations with
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the PRC during the 1980s, and the implications for Southeast
Asia were considerable. Soon after assuming the reins of the
Soviet Union, Gorbachev realized the dire straits of the
Soviet economy. If the enormous Soviet military expenditures
(on a scale previously unknown in history for a country not in
a major war) could be curtailed, it wnuld allow some breathing
space for the reforms of Perestroika (restructuring of the
economy)(Ref. 20]. In contrast to traditional Soviet
ideology, Gorbachev commented that "The Soviet Union does not
pretend to have the final truth. We do not impose our way of
life on other peoples."[Ref. 21] He recognized a
necessity in reducing tensions around the periphery of the
Soviet Union in order to focus on the Soviet economy, and
concurrently sought to increase Soviet influence abroad
through political and economic initiatives. In light of
Soviet policies in Afghanistan and Indochina, Asians tended to
view Gorbachev's initiatives with more skepticism than did
Europeans. Gorbachev appeared to see China as the key link in
Soviet efforts to penetrate Asian reluctance in the region.
Beijing, however, would not concede any ground to the Soviets
until the "three obstacles" to improved Sino-Soviet relations
were addressed: Afghanistan, Soviet support for Vietnam, and
the Soviet military presence along China's northern border.
Moscow complied, and the result was a much more stable
security environment in Southeast Asia.
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Under the more stable conditions in the region, the
economies of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore
flourished. They doubled their economic output during the
1980s, and their combined export trade expanded. During the
1980s American trade with Asian countries surpassed that with
the Europeans, and the trend continued. America and Asia
became more and more economically interdependent.
At the same time, however, the United States began to be
perceived as a Superpower on the edge of decline. Through the
Cold War, America's ability to successfully oppose the Soviets
by promoting economic growth and political stability in Asia
depended heavily upon U.S. economic strength. Americans
seemed willing to accept deficit spending to achieve military
and political goals. The spending included the costs of a
growing military budget, substantial foreign aid programs, and
the free flow of exports from Asian countries to America. [Ref.
13: p. 25] The seemingly once invincible America began to
show cracks in the foundation. The United States seemed to be
reeling under the weight of mounting domestic ills, including
the unmanageable budget deficits, overconsumption,
underinvestment, declining educational standards, drugs,
crime, the erosion of traditional values, and a dangerous
decline in the public's confidence in its political leaders
and institutions. To the hierarchically-minded Japanese that
had found so much to admire in postwar America, and to the
friendly Southeast Asian nations which prospered from the
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benevolent bedrock that was the U.S., the spectacle of the
apparent U.S. decline was deeply insettling[Ref. 22].
Major economic and strategic developments during the
closing years of the Reagan Administration were further
evidence of a growing tension between Washington and its chief
supporter in Southeast Asian security - Tokyo. In 1987 the
Japanese government enjoyed a trade surplus of $80 billion,
while the American trade deficit climbed to $174 billion.
Nearly $60 billion of that deficit was with the Japanese. In
April of 1987 President Reagan ordered the first trade
sanctions against Japan since World War II. In retaliation
for an alleged Japanese violation of a 1986 semiconductor
agreement, a 100% tariff was levied on $300 million worth of
imports containing computer chips from Japan. Later that year
tensions increased further with the disclosure that the
Toshiba Corporation sold eight computer-guided multiaxis
milling machines to the Soviet Union. With this new
technology the Soviets were theoretically able to mass produce
more silent submarines, thereby significantly endangering U.S.
national security. As a result, Japan was perceived by
Americans as enjoying protection by American forces while
aiding America's primary adversary for profit. (Ref. 19: p.
268] But Toshiba was not the only significant strain in the
relationship which was so important to the security of
Southeast Asia.
28
George Bush succeeded President Reagan in January, 1989.
He brought a wide foundation of experience with him to the
White House, including having been an ambassador to the United
Nations, U.S. representative in China, head of the CIA, and
Vice President. Known as pragmatic, his foreign policy had
often been highly conservative. In 1965 for example, he
declared, "I will back the President no matter what weapons we
use in Southeast Asia."[Ref. 23]
U.S. concerns over defense, technological, and economic
issues with Japan came to a head in the first year of the Bush
administration over the issue of the FSX fighter support
program. The debate carried over from President Reagan's last
years in office through the administration of President Bush.
The problem embodied most of the elements at the heart of the
difficulties in the relationship between the United States and
Japan. The FSX selection became one of the most important
issues in Japan's defense policy because the new aircraft was
to replace the aging F-ls - the backbone of the Japanese Air
Self Defense Force (JASDF). Beginning in 1985 to through
January 1986 American involvement with the FSX was on a very
small scale. Development was unilaterally Japanese. In 1988,
after more than a year of negotiations, the U.S. and Japanese
governments reached an agreement on the proposal that Japan
would co-develop with the United States a modified F-16 for
its next generation of jet fighter aircraft. The FSX was to
have a much greater range than the F-1 and therefore be able
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help fulfill the defense requirements in the new 1,000 mile
defense perimeter.[Ref. 24] Later, in early 1989,
opponents of the deal in Congress and the administration urged
reconsideration, pending a six month review of the pact's
long-term implications. They argued that it involved the sale
of advanced U.S. technology at a low price to a potential
major economic competitor in the aircraft/arms sales market.
Supporters of the deal pointed out that such a delay would
complicate Japanese defense planning and ran the risk of
undermining U.S. security interests in the region(Ref. 24: p.
472]. A heated debate raged in Congress over the issue, which
only narrowly passed(Ref. 13: p. 40]. However, U.S pressure
resulted once again in acquiescence by the Japanese in a major
defense policy. In the initial stage of the FSX selection
process, the U.S. government respected the autonomy of the
Japanese decision-making process and refrained from explicit
intervention. Eventually, when the American administration
coordinated its desires with those of Congress and U.S.
military industries, American pressure reached the point where
policy makers in Tokyo could no longer ignore it. Japan on
the other hand, had yet to transform its economic might into
diplomatic power capable of asserting more influence in
dealing with the United States. During the period of
negotiations and development of the FSX, however, the Japanese
purchased the U.S. F-15 and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and
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under license from McDonnell Douglass, began production of a
modified version of the fighter[Ref. 24: p. 468].
In conjunction with strained relations with the Japanese,
it was clear to the President that the world was changing at
a breakneck pace. Secretary of State James Baker professed in
1989, "The world has clearly outgrown the clash between the
superpowers that dominated world politics after World War
II."[Ref. 25] Nevertheless, there were no new
policies to deal with the changes. President Bush was
determined to keep military spending high, and maintain a
cautious approach to reformation. Moreover, the Democrats
outnumbered the Republicans in the House of Representatives,
which meant difficulty getting changes sponsored by the
Republican President throuqh the legislature.
In sharp contrast to the pragmatism of President Bush,
Secretary-General Gorbachev accelerated his changes in the
Soviet Union, the most significant of which manifest
themselves in three world-shaking policies. The first was the
"Sinatra Doctrine" - stipulating that East Europeans could do
things "their way," which resulted in the opening of the
Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989.[Ref. 23: pp. 328-329] The
second occurred on 20 December 1989 when Gorbachev renounced
both the use of for-e and Soviet imperialism. Third was the
decision by Gorbachev to use force to subdue the Azerbaijanis
who threatened to pull their region out of the U.S.S.R. His
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fear was that the Soviet Union itself may have fallen
apart.[Ref. 23: p. 330)
In summary, the United States was the major provider
for security in Southeast Asia during the final years of the
Cold War. Members of ASEAN viewed the U.S. military presence
as the best hope for preventing war. After the U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam through the last years of the Carter
administration, there was a fear of U.S. abandonment of the
region. The implications of "No More Vietnams" and the Nixon
Doctrine, stipulating nations in the region assume a greater
share of their security burden, were rather intimidating.
Human rights became a front line issue, as it had never
before. Later, President Reagan restored regional confidence
in America tilrough a stronger U.S. defense posture and a hard-
line foreign policy in the face of continued Soviet expansion
in the region, but at a high premium. Reagan used deficit
spending to finance the defense build up, which attributed to
the growing Asian perception of a United States in decline.
During the Reagan years ASEAN was one of the "six pillars" in
the U.S. policy in Asia symbolizing the U.S. commitment to
remain a Pacific power. Under U.S. pressure, Japan extended
its maritime defense zone from 200 nautical miles to 1,000
nautical miles and within 200 nautical miles of the
Philippines. Despite the controversies between the United
States and Japan, including the Toshiba debacle and the FSX
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controversy, Japan was the chief supporter of U.S. policy in
Southeast Asia.
C. THE JAPANESE ROLE
Southeast Asia is vitally important to Japan; in Japan's
need for Southeast Asian raw materials and markets; in the
need to ensure safe passage through the sea lanes north and
south from the Arab Middle East, and in the need for a
Southeast Asian partnership for the new role Japan seeks to
play in international affairs. Japan sees in Southeast Asia
a situation relating to Japan in the same way the Caribbean is
dominated by the United States. Moreover, Southeast Asia is
much more heterogenous than the Caribbean. There are
significant ethnic and religious disparity among the different
nations; and weighty economic disparity between various
nations such as for example between Singapore and Burma.
Therefore, ASEAN presents a means for the Japanese to take
advantage of the complexity of the region, and maintain the
benefits that Southeast Asia offers.(Ref. 26]
Historically, these considerations have always been at the
heart of Japanese policies toward Southeast Asia.
Conceivably the most important factor in the Japanese
attitude toward Southeast Asia was defeat at the hands of the
Allied powers in World War II. Until 1945 the Japanese had
never lost a war. They defeated the Chinese in 1895, the
Russians in 1905, and were on the side of the victorious
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Allies in World War I. Combined with spectacular success in
the initial months of World War II, defeat was traumatic. The
Japanese suffered the world's first nuclear attacks. The
trauma left a legacy of skepticism about the value of war and
an aversion to military buildups.
The most substantive evidence of Japanese opposition to
war came as a result of the American Occupation following the
War - article IX of the U.S. imposed Japanese Constitution
which states:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based onjustice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or
use of force as a means of settling international dispute.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,
land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential,
will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of
the state will not be recognized.
Additionally, the Constitution places limits on Japanese
defense policy,including restrictions on the deployment of the
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas, offensive weapons,
collective security arrangements, and conscription. Despite
the fact that the Japanese Constitution imposed military
restrictions on the Japanese, it does allow Japan the right of
self defense.
In 1951 the Japanese signed the first of two security
treaties with the United States. The American contribution
represented the cornerstone of Japanese defense policy. It
placed Japan under a protective "nuclear umbrella" for
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security against the Soviet Union (and later China), and
allowed the Japanese to focus their resources elsewhere.
The Japanese Prime Minister during the signing of the
treaty was a flamboyant leader who firmly believed that the
single most important goal of post-war Japan was economic
recovery. Yoshida Shigeru began his second term as Prime
Minister on October 15, 1948, and his emphasis on the economy
over everything else in the nation's priority became known as
the "Yoshida Doctrine".[Ref. 27] The result was a
minimum of defense spending, and the avoidance of involvement
in international politics[Ref. 27]. It was with the Yoshida
Doctrine that the Prime Minister re-established inroads to
Southeast Asia.
The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia during World War
II had left deep scars that were slow to heal. The bitter
memories represented a formidable obstacle to a return by the
Japanese to the region, albeit in the form of economic aid.
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Yoshida recognized the necessity
of Southeast Asian raw materials, energy, and a nearby
location for external investment - all critical to the
economic recovery of Japan.[Ref. 28] The solution
was a union of U.S. and Japanese policymakers. Prime Minister
Yoshida's doctrine of economics above all was united with the
American fear of the expansion of communism in the region.
Throughout Prime Minister Yoshida's administration,
tension between the United States and the Soviet Union
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escalated. As a direct result of the Cold War the Japanese
Defense Agency (JDA) and the Japanese Self Defense Forces
(JSDF) were officially established 1 July 1954.[Ref. 27: p. 6]
The JDA was designed as a unit directly under the Prime
Minister, intentionally devoid of the influence or prestige of
the Ministries.
For Prime Minister Yoshida, the danger was clear. In
November 1954, after the Geneva Conference, he stated:
The most immediate challenge to the free countries today
is the problem of combating Communism .... In order to
defend against Communism, it is urgent to promote the
economic development of Southeast Asia and to reinforce
their standard of living.[Ref. 27: p. 18]
It was only a matter of time before the Japanese would
formally promulgate their first defense policy since World War
II. Despite the limitations of the Japanese Constitution, the
anti-war attitude of the Japanese populace and the concerns
over re ival of Japanese militarism by Southeast Asians, the
Japanese published the Basic Policy of National Defense in May
1957. In addition to establishing minimum manpower and
equipment goals for the newly established SDF, it stipulated
support for the United Nations, development of an efficient
defense force pertinent to the nation's power and situation,
and joint security with the United States in order to "prevent
aggression" and, "once invaded, to repel
it."[Ref. 29] In 1957 the first official Japanese
policy toward Southeast Asia was promulgated in the first
White Paper on Japanese Diplomacy which stated:
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For our country which adopted pacifism as its basic policy
the only way to raise the living standards of the 90
million people living on the four small islands, and to
develop our economy is peaceful expansion of our economic
power.[Ref. 27: p. 17]
The next milestone came in 1960, which marked the end of
an era. From that year on the United States could no longer
presume to have its way in Japan without adequate respect for
Japanese sensitivities. As a result of Japan's economic
recovery, increased self-confidence and the growing anti-
American sentiment, both the Japanese and American governments
felt it would be wise to revise the security treaty. The
original treaty allowed the U.S. broad prerogatives in using
its bases in Japan for "the maintenance of international peace
and security in the Far East" and "the security of Japan."
United States forces could be employed, if requested by the
Japanese government, "to put down large-scale internal riots
and disturbances in Japan." These characteristics, concurrent
with the lack of any terminal date for the agreement, seemed
to some Japanese to be colonial in nature. The new Treaty of
Mutual Security and Cooperation, signed 19 January 1960, made
it clear that the U.S. would consult with the Japanese
government before using its bases in Japan directly for combat
elsewhere in Asia.[Ref. 30] The treaty revision proved to be
the demise of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (25 Feb. 1957 - 19
July 1960), however, and successive prime ministers Ikeda and
Sato had to divert the attention of the Japanese public to
non-defense issues.[Ref. 29: pp. 69,90] Consequently, the
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economic policies of income-doubling and high-growth came into
being [Ref. 27: p. 11].
During the 1960s and early 1970s the Japanese Government
pursued two dynamic political initiatives in Southeast Asia.
The first came in 1964 when Prime Minister Ikeda offered to
mediate in the conflict between Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines over the territorial claim to Sabah. The summit
convened in Tokyo, but failed to produce any concrete results.
The second was in May, 1970 when the Sato Cabinet became
involved in a bid to end the Vietnam War. The Japanese played
a leading role in securing the "neutrality" of an Asian
conference held in Jakarta, but obviously failed to resolve
the conflict.
Japanese policy makers did not attempt any further high
profile diplomatic negotiations until 1974, and for the next
several years focused on a low key policy of economic
expansion in Southeast Asia. It was in their pursuit of this
objective that the Japanese formulated their first official
policy toward the region - they saw the reparations issue as
the catalyst for Japanese economic re-entry into the region.
The first significant change to the Japanese Security
policy during the Cold War came with the introduction of the
Nixon Doctrine in July 1969. The Doctrine placed a new
emphasis on U.S. partners to further support the U.S. position
by doing more on their own behalf.[Ref. 31] The
policy began as retrenchment or "lower profile" in Asia by the
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U.S., as a symbol of a new era in the region. The visit by
President Nixon to China in 1972 was the first significant
"Nixon Shoku" for Japanese policy makers. To the Japanese,
the Nixon Doctrine represented the threat of China supplanting
Japan in U.S. policy. The oil crisis of 1973 further
heightened the sense of Japanese insecurity. Meanwhile, the
Vietnam conflict was escalating. During the Vietnam War, the
Japanese were able to successfully pursue their "peaceful"
economic expansion into Southeast Asia. While the nations of
the region were immersed in the Cold War the Japanese attained
a position as the leading trader and investor in the
region.[Ref. 31, 116: p. 19] As early as 1964 Japan's trade
with Southeast Asia surpassed that of the United States.(Ref.
31, 116: p. 19] But to some, both in Southeast Asia and the
United States the Japanese were perceived as economic
predators, exchanging military occupation for economic
domination. The result was the tumultuous reception of Prime
Minister Kakuei Tanaka, who toured Southeast Asia in 1974.
The anti-Japanese sentiment exploded into violent riots in
Bangkok and Jakarta. In Singapore, students submitted a
memorandum condemning Japanese business practices, and in
Malaysia, Prime Minister Tanaka's effigy was burnt along with
Japanese flags.[Ref. 32] Tokyo chose to revamp its
Southeast Asian policy just two decades after initiating its
low profile policy of "economic diplomacy."
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With the end of the Vietnam War, gone was the Cold War
environment which had nurtured Japan's policy of pursuing
economic gain without regard for meaningful political
discourse. The end of the Vietnam War also gave use to a
Japanese perception of a decline in American commitments in
Asia. American military power was judged to be on the decline
as compared to that of the Soviet Union which seemed to be on
the rise. At the end of the war in Vietnam in April, 1975,
the Japanese recognized a necessity to make changes which
would radically change their relationship with Southeast Asia.
In 1976 the Japanese defense officials designed a defense
policy which not only represented an autonomous defense
posture, but defined for the first time since World War II the
minimum level of force necessary for Japan in peacetime.[Ref
27: p. 12] The National Defence Program Outline (NDPO)
stipulated that Japan should posses a force large enough to
meet and repel a "limited and small scale aggression" and that
the assistance from the U.S. should be sought if an assault
should exceed the Defense capabilities.(Defense Agency 1977,
pp. 143-150) It was designed to delineate the minimum level
of defense forces necessary for Japan in peacetime.
The Outline provided only general force level targets and
lid not stipulate the specific types of equipment. Instead it
recognized the need for defense against sea and air borne
assaults, and enhanced the Japanese ability to engage in
sustained combat operations. It was further designed to
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improve Japanese command, control, communications and
information processes (C31), thereby qualitatively enhancing
Japanese defense capabilities.[Ref. 33] But the NDPO
proved controversial both in Japan and Southeast Asia. With
the NDPO the Japanese Government shifted away from fixed
programs of defense spending. The NDPO had no target date for
completion and thereby raised concerns of uncontrolled growth
in defense spending. As a result, in November 1976, the
Japanese government announced a ceiling on defense spending of
one percent of gross national product (GNP).[Ref. 31: pp. 91-
93]
One of the most significant results of the American
withdrawal from the Vietnam, however, was the Japanese
declaration to "forge a closer relationship with ASEAN". With
that announcement, Prime Minister Fukuda unveiled his "Fukuda
Doctrine" in Kuala Lumpur at a meeting of the ASEAN heads of
government on 18 August 1977. With the doctrine, the Japanese
took up the challenge of greater international
responsibilities with a significant advancement in the
relationship between Japan and Southeast
Asia.[Ref. 34] In its third Principle, the doctrine
states:
Japan will be an equal partner of ASEAN and its member
countries and co-operate positively with them in their
efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience,
together with other nations of like mind outside the
region, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on
mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina and
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will thus contribute to the building peace and prosperity
throughout Southeast Asia.[Ref. 27: p. 22]
The Fukuda Doctrine represented the formalizing of Japan's
official political relations with Southeast Asian countries.
Since its inception Japanese prime ministers have made it a
priority to pay official visits to the region. The benefits
included sharpened diplomatic skills of the prime ministers,
and a stronger Japanese position in talks with Western
countries.
In his doctrine Prime Minister Fukuda also made his
position on the Japanese defense posture clear. As a result
of the constraints placed on Japan - the U.S. imposed
constitution, the prohibition of weapons exports, the
forbiddance of the deployment of Japanese forces abroad, and
Japan's obligations in collective security arrangements -
Prime Minister Fukuda made this addition to his doctrine:
Japan, a nation committed to peace, rejects the role of a
military power, and on that basis is resolved to
contribute to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia,
and of the world community.[Ref. 27: p. 26]
Japan's direct military involvement in the region appeared to
be out of the question indefinitely. On the other hand, a low
profile, indirect approach to Southeast Asian security was
deemed necessary to compensate for the reduction of American
forces and commitments in the region after the U.S. withdrawal
from Vietnam. The Japanese proceeded on three fronts. First,
as initiated in the Fukuda Doctrine, Japanese policymakers
maintained a visible political agenda with ASEAN. Second, the
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Japanese proceeded in a remarkable buildup of their own
defenses, beginning with the NDPO. Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, the Japanese proceeded in all their initiatives
on a basis that was increasingly independent of the United
States.
Politically, Fukuda made two significant moves. One year
after the proclamation of the Fukuda Doctrine, he orchestrated
the first Japan-ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Conference, and later
established the Japan-ASEAN forum.
All the while the perceived Soviet military threat in the
region began to loom larger than ever before. In 1977 the
Soviets initiated a massive buildup of their armed forces in
Asia. Their objectives appeared to be first to encircle
China, and second to prepare for the possible formation of a
coalition of U.S., Chinese, and Japanese forces against the
Soviet Union. In 1978 Moscow created an independent theater
command for its "Far East" forces and accelerated the
expansion of its Pacific fleet (at this time the largest of
the four Soviet fleets). In 1978 the Soviets began to employ
their most modern aircraft and armor to the Far East.
Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft carrier
Minsk, arguably the most powerful ship of its class in the
world, and the amphibious ship Ivan Rogov were added to the
Pacific Fleet. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and a rapid
deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations enabled the Soviets
to acquire the use of the former U.S. naval and air bases at
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Cam Ranh Bay.(Ref. 20: p. 5] Then, in 1978 the Soviets took
over the sole sponsorship of Vietnam and later the same year
invaded Afghanistan and dramatically changed Japanese regional
security perspective.
Until the Soviet invasion, Japanese leaders maintained a
low-profile tone in introducing defense policy, while pursuing
a robust economic policy. The invasion acted as the stimulus
for a series of issues pressing the Japanese for change. The
increased Soviet threat combined with the declining U.S.
presence in Asia, and the accompanying American pressure for
burden sharing resulted in several modifications of Japanese
defense strategy. In May 1981 Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko (17
July 1980 - 27 Nov. 1982) met with President Reagan and
pledged that the Japanese would assume a greater role in the
defense of Japan. As a result, the decision was made by the
Japanese to extend Japan's defense perimeter to 1,000 miles
east and south - a momentous departure from Japan's previous
Cold War defense posture [Ref. 31: p. 96]. The next
significant modifications of Japanese defense strategy were
embodied in the dynamic policies of Prime Minister Nakasone
Yasuhiro (27 Nov. 1982 - 6 Nov. 1987).
Under Prime Minister Nakasone, the Japanese significantly
reinforced their security cooperation with the United States,
thereby strengthening the security link between Japan, the
United States and ASEAN.[Ref. 35]. This was
accomplished first by relaxing defense technology exports to
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the U.S. in November 1983. Next, the Japanese Premier
established regular, large scale, combined Japan-U.S. military
exercises. Soon thereafter, he promised the participation of
the private sector of Japan with the United States Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI). Other decisions, however, did more
to increase Southeast Asian anxiety over renewed militarism by
Japan.
In September 1985 Prime Minister Nakasone made a pivotal
decision when he approved the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP)
for the period 1986-1990. In comparison with the intent of
the NDPO, the MTDP placed greater emphasis on sea control
capability and the establishment of an air defense screen.
The MTDP further stipulated an attainable end date for the
fulfillment of the NDPO force levels.[Ref. 36] To
accomplish this goal, however, the Japanese Premier revoked
the decade old one percent ceiling placed on defense spending.
These represent impressive accomplishments for a Japanese
prime minister in a political system that traditionally
demands consesus decision making. Any individual who shows
initiative must attain consensus support before action can be
taken.
To allay Southeast Asian fears of renewed militarism in
Japan, Prime Minister Nakasone adhered to the Fukuda Doctrine
and visited each of the nations of ASEAN. During his visit he
defended Japanese security policies as being purely defensive
in nature, and increased the Japanese financial aid package
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over that offered by each of his
predecessors[Ref. 37].
Paul Maidment of the Economist had this to say about
Japanese security in 1989:
That Japan's security depends on its economic strength is
the main premise of Japanese foreign policy. So its broad
aim in East and Southeast Asia is to sustain a stable and
capitalist region that can provide raw materials,
factories and, increasingly, markets for its industries.
Part of what Japanese companies and their patron
ministries, particularly, MITI, are doing is to expand the
Japanese economy beyond the country's geographical
borders. Over the next decade, how Japan continues to do
this will determine in large part the way the region
develops. The goal would be to integrate the economies of
the [old] NICs and the new NICs into something that would
look a lot like a greater Japan, Inc. Its core would be
Japan. Industrial policy would be coordinated from Tokyo.
[It] would be done by something called the "Asian Brain,"
[which] would control the disposition of industrial
investment throughout Japan and the region and coordinate
the necessary policy support by the governments of those
countries. The [cortex of the] "Asian Brain' is clearly
intended to be the Japanese civil service, just as MITI
was the brain behind Japan, Inc., in the 1960s[Ref. 38].
In retrospect, Japanese officials in 1994 contend that
1989 was a turning point in their search for a greater
political and security roles in Southeast Asia to match
Japan's economic prowess. That year the Japanese economy
peaked with investment in the region that gave it an
unquestioned commercial presence. Emperor Hirohito died in
1989 and with him perished a strong historical linkage with
Japan's wartime occupation of Southeast Asia. In 1989, on the
occasion of Tiananmen, the Japanese demonstrated that they
could break with the United States in regard to human rights
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by responding calmly, as opposed to with infuriation. And
Tokyo played an influential but reserved role in the 1989
start of the new Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation regional
forum.[Ref. 39]
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III. CHANGES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA SINCE THE END OF THE COLD VAR
The end of the Cold War brought about many changes to
Southeast Asia. The global Cold War imposed its division:
ASEAN aligned with the West and Indochina with the U.S.S.R.
The major security threat was from Vietnam, which led to
ASEAN's cohesion behind its most threatened front line member,
Thailand, in the first place. Moscow's decision to stop
subsidizing Vietnam's aggression in Cambodia and the
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Vietnam led to a retraction
in Hanoi's position as well. The new Vietnamese reorientation
toward domestic affairs seemed to remove a significant
cohesive element in ASEAN.[Ref. 40]
One major question for policy makers in ASEAN was whether
it was necessary for the United States to maintain a military
presence in the region with the atrophy of the Soviet threat,
and for that matter an apparent absence of any specific
threat. The answer was a qualified yes. If the U.S.
departed, the result would be a danger represented by nations
with questionable intentions toward American interests in the
region. In that light, Japan became a focal point.
Throughout the Cold War Japan substantially increased its
defense capabilities and stepped up security cooperation with
the United States. It also expanded its financial
contributions to the United Nations' peacekeeping and
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humanitarian activities. Japan's military responsibility
expanded to 1,000 nautical miles from Japanese shores and was
restricted to the protection of the sea lines of communication
(SLOCs). But Tokyo was no longer content with passively
following Washington's leadership in global affairs, as
outlined so carefully in the Yoshida Doctrine. The Japanese
demonstrated a desire to participate in power sharing in the
post Cold War.
Changes came about with the end of the Cold War which
prompt the U.S. and Japan to reassess continuously their
traditional roles. The once-menacing ships of the Soviet
Pacific Fleet are in 1994 rusting in port. The 1992
withdrawal of the United States from its substantial
facilities in the Philippines including Subic Bay Naval Base,
Cubi Point Naval Air Station, and Clark Air Force Base, has
left a security vacuum. China's economic dynamism has allowed
it to expand its military muscle, and Japan's economic
dominance has led it to search for a new role in the
guardianship of regional peace.[Ref. 41] Southeast
Asians are no longer convinced that they can rely solely on
their western partners for security. Moreover, each nation in
Southeast Asia is being forced to identify its own potential
threats. Old suspicions are reviving, and all the nations of
ASEAN are stockpiling arms.
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A. REMOVAL OF THE THREAT OF WORLD COKINISM
Despite the end of the Cold War, some ideological
differences remain. Four of the world's five remaining
Communist run nations are in Asia. According to Winston Lord,
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, "Asia is caught in a time warp."[Ref. 42]
There remain a number of dormant issues and disputes which
could escalate into hostilities in the absence of a security
framework according to the International Institute for
Strategic Studies. Power is being redistributed between the
United States, China, Japan, and the nations of ASEAN.[Ref.
41: p. 12] To manage the anxieties of the post Cold War,
Southeast Asian nations are using preventive diplomacy in
order to maintain the dialogue between nations of historic and
potential conflict in the region.[Ref. 41: p. 12]
One such group is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
forum, or APEC, founded by twelve Asia-Pacific nations in
Canberra in 1989, and in 1994 includes fifteen member
economies[Ref. 43]. APEC has shown little cohesion
since its inception. Its listless performance has been
indicative of the diversity of its cor3tituents, the emphasis
on a consensus for decisions, and an abundance of political
jockeying between the participants. APEC - incorporating the
ASEAN nations and Australia, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Japan,
New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States -
incorporates the most dynamic and energetic economies in the
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world [Ref. 44]. Despite its diversity, Asia has a
"much greater sense of community," than it did during the Cold
War according to Mr. Lord [Ref. 42: p. 4].
In keeping with his principle campaign promise - to
concentrate on the American economy - President Clinton has
successfully blended foreign policy with American economic
interests in two important instances: the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the APEC. With the successful
passage of NAFTA through the Congress, President Clinton
fulfilled initiatives of his predecessors, but in hosting the
APEC summit in Seattle in November 1993 and meeting
individually with Asian heads of state, he executed a
brilliant political masterstroke, bound to further improve
economic ties with the region. At the summit President
Clinton made these comments:
The fastest-growing region is the Asian Pacific, a region
that has to be vital for our future. In the span of a few
years, these Asian economies have gone from being thought
of as "Dominos" in the struggle between Communism and
democracy to "dynamos" driving the world economy. We
cannot let our national worries blind us to our national
interests. More than ever our security is tied to
economics. Military threats remain, and they require our
vigilance and resolve, but increasingly our place in the
world will be determined as much by the skills of our
workers as by the strength of our weapons, as much by our
ability to pull down foreign trade barriers as our ability
to breach distant ramparts.[Ref. 45]
One of the greatest concerns in the "community" is the
PRC, whose intentions are still not clear. There seems to be
a disparity between what the Chinese are doing and what they
are saying. Plans to build a "blue water navy" for example,
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do not jibe with Chinese foreign policy of peace and its
abiding by the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence"
whereby mainland China will abide by its principle of non-
intervention in other's internal affairs, particularly in the
South China Sea(Ref. 46]. For that matter, recent
Chinese nuclear tests and Chinese diffidence over ruling out
a violent takeover of Taiwan have not added to a sense of
security by the nations of Southeast Asia.
In spite of the revarkable growth of the Chinese economy,
however, few policy makers in Southeast Asia fear a Chinese
military threat now(Ref. 47]. According to
Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, "They want
stability and certainty for the next few decades so that they
can carry on with their economic reforms."[Ref. 48]
"After the Cold War, the main issue in Asia is the absence of
an overriding threat," relates security specialist Zakaria
Haji Ahmad from the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur[Ref.
41: p. 12]. It is ironic that many Southeast Asians remember
the PRC support of Communist insurgents during the Cold War,
yet tend to sympathize with mainland China after the Tiananmen
Square massacre.[Ref. 41]
Increasingly, the nations of ASEAN are finding that the
idea of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality during the
Cold War was unrealistic. Sitting at the crossroads of two
oceans, possessing vast natural resources, and now
experiencing booming economies, the commodities of Southeast
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Asia are too tempting to resist for the major powers. "We
tried to deny that there would be a power vacuum if the US
withdrew," said the director of the Institute for Security and
International Studies in Bangkok, Kusuma Snitwongse. "While
it's old thinking to suggest that we should hang on to a U.S.
military presence, in this uncertain period there's an
ambivalence. If the U.S. leaves, will Japan and China be more
aggressive in the region?"[Ref. 41: p.12]
Currently, the military threat of Japan is minimal to the
region. The Japanese seem to be constrained by their "peace"
constitution, and a dependence on the U.S. military forces
under the 1960 Security Treaty. The Japanese Armed Forces
have 245,000 personnel, only 155,000 of which belong to the
Ground Self Defense Force[Ref. 49], and the numbers
are shrinking with Prime Minister Hosokawa's intention to lead
the world in disarmament.[Ref. 41: p. 12]
Of principle concern to Southeast Asia, however, is the
fact that Japan could transform its technological superiority
and economic might into the development of powerful weapons of
mass destruction quickly. The threat of a North Korean
nuclear arsenal adds impetus to the
argument.[Ref. 50] Moreover, in September 1993 the
United States unveiled a policy that it will "not oppose
programs by Japan to keep producing plutonium." Consequently,
the Japanese will soon have a large stockpile of plutonium
that could be used in nuclear weapons.[Ref. 51]
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Other concerns include a widespread feeling that Japan has
failed to learn from its occupa.t'on of Southeast Asia before
and during World War II.[Ref. 41: p. 12] The Japanese
Ministry of Education, for instance, has yet to accept
textbooks containing balanced accounts of the
war[Ref. 52]. "For Japan not to tell its children
what happened in the war-it causes a lot of worry," according
to Tommy Koh, a former Singaporean ambassador to the United
States(Ref. 41: p. 13]. And yet the Liberal Democratic Party
of Japan, in power from 1955 until voters turned it out of
office in June 1993, showed a guarded limited willingness for
greater Japanese engagement of Southeast Asian interests,
other than to fall in line with the policy of the United
States. The younger generation of politicians forming the
backbone of Japan's new ruling coalition seem willing to
assert a more assertive foreign policy in the region. To
accomplish this, the new Japanese politicians must assure wary
Southeast Asian neighbors that the country has fully exorcised
any latent nationalist tendencies.[Ref. ?] In that regard
Prime Minister Hosokawa has publicly expressed responsibility
for his country's actions during World War II[Ref. 53].
A stronger, more assertive Japanese foreign policy is also
disconcerting to Southeast Asia. It could mean a permanent
seat for Japan on the United Nations Security Council,
Japanese participation in more United Nations missions in
trouble spots, and in the Japanese leadership taking more
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decisive, independent viewpoints on international affairs
issues.[Ref. 52] What bothers Southeast Asians the most,
however, is that with a growing independence the Japanese may
decide to leave the U.S. security umbrella[Ref. 41: p. 12].
It is not only the Japanese that have added to regional
anxiety. Though inactive, the Russian Pacific Fleet is not
impotent. The fact that Moscow seeks to maintain some of its
access to the warm-water port in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay is
likewise cause for concern.[Ref. 41: p. 13]
Adding fuel to the fire, the Clinton administration
outlined a new defense strategy 16 May 1993. The plan, which
became known as the "win-hold-win" doctrine, was in sharp
contrast to the previous U.S. defense strategy. Instead of
being able to fight and win two major conflicts
simultaneously, win-hold-win stipulated that U.S. forces would
hold the enemy in a second conflict until the first was
won.[Ref. 54] If a new Korean war broke out, for
example, U.S. forces may not be able to come to the aid of
their friends in Southeast Asia if battles also erupted over
the oil rich Spratly Islands, or civil war in the Philippines
broke out, or if armed conflict between mainland China and
Taiwan occurred.
After criticism, the administration switched back to a
"win-win" policy on 24 June to alleviate the fears of U.S.
allies, but the policy reversal could not conceal the heart of
the issue - the dwindling amount of money available for tV.i
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U.S. defense budget. "The budget is driving the strategy, not
the other way round," according to William Taylor, Vice
President of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies.[Ref. 54]
To calm some of their misgivings, the member states of
ASEAN decided in 1992 to build on the 25-year success of their
organization by starting a new group dedicated to security
issues. Invited to join the group were Japan, China, Russia,
South Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Canada, the
European Community, Australia, New Zealand, and the United
States.[Ref. 55] The group is enigmatically known as
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)[Ref. 41], and their first
regional security dialogue was held in Singapore when the
foreign ministers met between 26 and 28 July 1993. Admiral
David Jeremiah, Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff, made this comment about the Southeast Asian security
dialogue:
In Europe, there are a number of institutions in which
security questions can be addressed. In Asia, there
[have been] no such institutions. This is one of the
great differences between the two continents. In
Asia, you [haven't had] the sorts of political
dialogues to reduce the tensions that have emerged
following the end of the Cold War. It's time for Asia
to begin a dialogue. The best approach to security is
not to have your first line of defence in military
forces but rather to reduce tensions and to engage in
conflict resolution. This new forum emerging through
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will give
the U.S. and other countries in the Asia-Pacific
region the opportunity to start talking about issues
that divide us, create tensions and pose security
threats.[Ref. 56]
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But the ARF began with more that its share of snags.
Japan did not want Russia and China to be invited, and the
United States expressed its desire to exclude Vietnam from the
group. As might be expected, these apprehensions were
addressed in the gradualist ASEAN way of doing business - "As
a minimum you keep all the countries talking," said Mr.
Koh[Ref. 41]. At the first dinner between the foreign
ministers, for example, U.S. Secretary of State Warren
Christopher was seated next to Vietnamese Foreign Minister
Nguyen Manh Kam[Ref. 55]. The meeting offered the opportunity
for the U.S. to hold the highest level talks with Vietnam
under the Clinton administration. "The problem is not how to
exclude anybody, but how to keep this happy state of affairs,"
says Bilahari Kausikan, head of the East Asia and Pacific
Bureau in Singapore's Foreign Ministry, "It's a matter of a
balance of big powers, not the vacuum of power(Ref. 41]."
More substantive talks are slated for the summer of 1994 in
Thailand.
During the Cold War, ASEAN shied away from forming a
security forum. It is ironic that now, in a period seen by
many as one of reduced tensions ASEAN should decide that it is
time to initiate a security forum. For the first time,
defense officials from each of the ASEAN nations will meet in
the coming months to lay the groundwork for the ARF
meeting[Ref. 41].
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B. NEW AWARENESS OF THE GROWING POWER OF CHINA
With the economy booming at a 12% annual clip and
exceeding that figure in 1994, the PRC's emergence is of
critical importance to the region. The potential for China to
become a 21st century economic powerhouse, dismissed as naive
after the Tianamen Square incident in 1989, is highly
credible. Most economists predict China will sustain an
average growth rate of at least 7% over the next 10 years.
That means that its gross domestic product, unofficially
estimated at $1.2 trillion, would double by early next
century, firmly establishing China as one of the world's top
economic powers.[Ref. 57] China's economic success
has allowed the Chinese to pursue an expansive military build
up. Defense spending in 1990-91 was increased by 15.5 per
cent over the previous year. In 1991-1992 military spending
was further raised by 13.8 %.[Ref. 58]
Undoubtedly, one of the most significant developments in
the PRC is the transformation of the Army. Ever since the
Communist Party congress of 1992, which sanctified the PRC's
move toward a market economy, the military has been in
ascendancy[Ref. 59]. Military professionals have
assumed a higher political profile as the ruling Communists
prepare for an uncertain transition after the death of Deng
Xiaoping(Ref. ?].
Additionally, a significant military reorganization has
sidetracked hard line Communist ideologues in the People's
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Liberation Army (PLA) and strengthened professionally oriented
officers determined to turn their once peasant Army into a
technologically sophisticated economic and fighting
force.[Ref. 591 The PLA is shifting from a large manpower-
intensive force with relatively obsolete equipment to a
smaller, more capable force. The total strength of the PLA
has dropped from approximately four million personnel in the
mid-1980s to roughly three million today. As a result, more
money has been funneled into the development and production of
modern missiles, aircraft and ships[Ref. 60].
Beijing is taking advantage of hard economic times in
Russia by acquiring a wide range of sophisticated weapons at
dramatically reduced prices. Items the PRC desires include
MiG-31 interceptors, Tu-22 bombers, T-72M main battle tanks,
A-50 airborne early warning and control planes and S-300
ground-based antiballistic missiles[Ref. 60: p. 143]. This
equipment would beef up an already impressive arsenal
consisting of Soviet made long-range Su-27 fighter aircraft,
IL-76 transport planes, and know how that give its bombers a
range of more than 1000 nautical miles(Ref. 61].
Despite its recent emphasis on the development of
conventional weapons, Beijing's wild card from the Cold War
remains its nuclear weapons capability. The PRC now possesses
a fully developed nuclear stockpile. Its nuclear weaponry
includes eight intercontinental ballistic missiles, 60
intermediate-range ballistic missiles and one nuclear-powered
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ballistic missile carrying submarine. Though small by U.S.
and Russian ballistic missile submarine standards, the Chinese
Xia is equipped with 12 sea-launched ballistic
missiles.[Ref. 62] Moreover, recent reports indicate
that the PRC is enhancing its nuclear delivery capabilities by
developing a new missile-launching submarine, though
construction is reported to be delayed[Ref. 60: p. 148].
Other nuclear capabilities include PRC possession of
approximately 200 nuclear-capable bombers[Ref. 62: p. 99].
According to some analysts, with its increased military
expenditures, mainland China is placing a greater emphasis on
preparation for regional conflict - a point not missed by
Southeast Asian neighbors. In 1985 China's Central Military
Commission directed the PLA to shift its primary strategic
concentration from preparation for a general war with the
former Soviet Union, to preparation for more small scale,
limited war on the Chinese periphery[Ref. 63]. The
"peripheral defense" concept has translated to a particularly
disconcerting emphasis on the South China Sea.
Since the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of the
U.S. Navy from the Philippines, control over the Spratly
Islands in the South China Sea has become a heated issue. The
Spratlys chain, comprising about 60 islands, are claimed in
part or whole by six countries: the PRC, Vietnam, Taiwan,
Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. The island chain is
coveted not only because it offers the ability to oversee much
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of the maritime traffic between the Pacific and Indian oceans,
but it is estimated that as much as one trillion dollars in
oil and gas may lie in the geological structures beneath the
Spratly seabed.[Ref. 64] Despite the fact that the
United States does not officially support any of the claimants
(Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines, the PRC and Vietnam), the
presence of United States warships and aircraft in the region
has a stabilizing effect. [Ref. 25: p. 666]
The March 1988 clash between the PRC and Vietnam is fresh
in the memories of regional leaders. The PRC displayed a
disconcerting capability of maritime power projection during
the operation. During the campaign the PLAN masterfully
employed destroyers, frigates, supply ships, marines, and a
surprisingly proficient amphibious force(Ref. 65].
The islands occupied by the PRC were just outside the
Malaysian, and within the Philippine, claim areas. The PRC
claims include all of the islands in the Pratas Island,
Macclesfield Bank, Paracel, and Spratly island groups -
virtually every island in the South China Sea [Ref. 40: pp.
664, 666].
To help defuse rising pressure concerning the Spratlys,
Indonesia, which does not claim any of the islands, has
sponsored several informal "workshops" since 1991 among the
six nations to discuss possible joint development of the
island chain[Ref. 64]. Regardless or the workshops, however,
the PLA has continued its expansion in the region.
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Beijing's military buildup on Hainan and Woody Islands in
the South China Sea sends a clear signal of an inclination to
dominate the South China Sea by force while professing a
willingness to negotiate shared control with other claimants
to both the Spratly and Paracel chains. Recently, a military
airstrip capable of accommodating the Su-27 fighters, and new
naval facilities were completed on Woody Island[Ref. 60: p.
140]. Reports indicate that the Su-27s can provide air cover
for the PLAN over virtually all of the South China Sea. The
Su-27s decisively alter the military balance in Southeast Asia
as the PRC will have an air capability encompassing all of the
region and beyond - including as far as Japan. [Ref. 58: p. 34]
Concerned, Tokyo is said to have quietly warned Russia that
upsetting the military balance in East Asia by strengthening
China with high-technology conventional weaponry will hurt
Moscow's chances for massive aid from Japan and the West for
reconstruction.(Ref. 58: p. 34]
Beijing's willingness to flex its new military muscle in
the region was typified when an agreement for oil-exploration
was signed with Denver-based Crestone Energy Corporation in an
area in the Spratlys. Though the territory is also claimed
by Vietnam, Beijing has threatened to use "full force" if
necessary in support of the project[Ref. 61].
Yet the recent assertive policies of the PRC in the South
China Sea have raised several related issues. According to
62
the assistant director-general of Malaysia's Institute of
Strategic and International Studies:
Its continuing preoccupation with domestic politics, the
complexity of international relations, the need to deal
with the sovereign states of Southeast Asia as equals and
the need to delicately balance the interests of the U.S.
and Russia do not seem to inhibit China's new hegemonic
interest in the region.[Ref. 66]
Some experts claim that Beijing's assertiveness has provided
a motive for the Japanese to further build up their military.
Sill others think the PRC is providing a pretext for friendly
nations to adopt a two-China policy by recognizing
Taiwan.[Ref. 66] Yet if Chinese attitudes are any indication
of future relations, the road ahead will be a rocky one.
Historically, the Chinese have not dealt with the nations
of Southeast Asia as equal partners. For centuries the Middle
Kingdom of China exacted tribute from the region. During the
Cold War the PRC under Mao Zedong was seen by many Southeast
Asian governments to be violent, unfriendly and unpredictable.
On numerous occasions the PRC interfered in the internal
affairs of countries in the region through repeated appeal for
assistance from Chinese living abroad. Currently Southeast
Asian countries are naturally leery of Beijing's intentions.
Although Southeast Asia enjoys relative stability compared
to the rest of the world, many of the nations still worry
about East-West tensions and decreasing U.S. military power in
the region. The PRC's recent decision to end an informal
world moratorium nuclear testing highlights the problem.
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Despite strong U.S. pressure and President Clinton's personal
appeal for restraint, China resumed testing in early October,
1993 after more than a year of tests, when it exploded a
nuclear device in its western desert.
Some regional analysts were concerned that the test would
bring about new fears throughout Asia and hurt efforts to
pressure North Korea into halting its nuclear weapons program.
Others said the blast simply underscored what Southeast Asians
already knew: the PRC is an impressive military power,
unafraid of flexing its muscle.[Ref. 59]
As an alternative measure, the members of ASEAN are
weighing the decision to accept an economically strengthening,
and militarily powerful Vietnam as an equal partner in the
Association. Although tensions have cooled with the PRC, with
its large standing army, Vietnam could add its weight to the
deterrents of Chinese power.
C. THE GROWING NEEDS OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA
Southeast Asia is one of the world's most economically
energetic regions, whose countries are voraciously hunting for
foreign investment. Big players like Japan, some Europeans
and the United States are competing to provide it. But any
overview of regional national development cannot escape the
predominant economic presence of Japan in Southeast Asia.
Equally as evident is the growing sense of reluctance by
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regional leaders toward the membership in the "Yen Bloc."
Instead they favor Western investment which usually means
fewer strings attached. "ASEAN sees Japan only as a money
bag, which they think they should use for their own purposes."
according to Mochtar Kususa-amadja, Indonesia's former Foreign
minister.[Ref. 2: p. 111]
Intra-Asian trade now exceeds Asia's trade with the rest
of the world. One of the primary reasons is Japan's trade and
investment through the Cold War. In the 1960s, 1970s, and
early 1980s Southeast Asia was largely dependent on Japan.
Now, in the early 90s however, Japan relies on Asia for over
30 percent of its total exports, a three-fold increase since
1985.[Ref. 67] Japan now imports more color TVs, for
example, than it exports from its own shores. Moreover, with
another rapid yen appreciation in the nedr future, a second
Japanese import wave in finished products from Southeast Asia
may be just around the corner. But the fact that Japan is
importing more from the region, may not necessarily be good
for Southeast Asians. Regional exports in many cases
represent the fruit from seed- planted by the Japanese. As
described by Japanese author Hasegawa Keitaro, Japan's role in
Asia is that of a fisherman who holds a line tied around the
neck of a cormorant catching fish in its beak. The bird does
all the work, but the man reaps the reward since the line
prevents the bird from swallowing. Japanese firms provide the
means for Southeast Asian nations to export, but mainly for
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Japan's benefit.[Ref. 67: p. 13] During theColdWarthe U.S.
neglected the nonaligned nations, focusing its attention and
spending its dollars on "friends and allies." As a result,
Japan outdistanced the United States as a benefactor in
Malaysia and Indonesia. For many of the nations of ASEAN,
Japan provides the "core" economy. Malaysia for example has
become the world's biggest exporter of air conditioners, all
made in Japanese factories.[Ref. 67: p. 11]
Japan is Malaysia's number one trading partner, accounting
for about a fifth of its total trade (23 percent of all its
imports and over 20 percent of exports). More specifically,
Japan buys a third of Malaysia's oil, 30 percent of its tin,
two-thirds of its raw logs and cut timber, and virtually all
of its natural gas. In return Japanese capital goods,
technology, and manufactured components make up over 80
percent of Malaysia's imports. But the Japanese have given
Malaysia other claims to fame. They are the world's third-
largest producer of semiconductors, and the worlds leading
exporter of chips.[Ref. 2: pp. 231-232] Only recently have
electronics and eli- cal products surpassed Malaysia's
traditional exports oi rubber and tin.
Since the end of the Cold War Indonesia has been Japan's
single most important overseas market for direct investment in
Asia.[Ref. 68] Japanese firms have invested nearly
10 billion dollars there and ranked number one in foreign
investment in Indonesia. The United States is third behind
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Hong Kong with just under 2 billion dollars, mostly in oil and
gas. Japan is also Indonesia's number-one foreign lender.
Fast growth in the money supply prompted Jakarta to implement
a tight monetary policy, forcing the private sector in
Indonesia to go to foreign banks (primarily Japanese) for
investment financing.[Ref. 68] Indonesian policy makers are
concerned with the degree and depth of Japanese involvement in
their economy. According to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas,
Japan is without question our largest market and the
dominant commercial and financial power in the region, as
well as the source of most of our technology. A country
with such overwhelming economic power may one day want to
play an equivalent role politically and militarily. How
does that affect us? Can we be ambivalent? And how can
we possibly offset Japan's strength? Well, one way is by
the process of multilateralization, by encouraging the
U.S. to invest more here.[Ref. 2: p. 119]
Though Indonesia's Gross Domestic Product is the largest in
Southeast Asia, its revenues come primarily from its natural
resources, namely petroleum and liquefied natural
gas.[Ref. 69] The Japanese account for 40 percent of
Indonesia's exports, while the United States accounts for 14
percent. Nevertheless, economic growth is strong, averaging
over 7 percent in the last three years. Each year, however,
President Soeharto is closer to his plan to diversify
Indonesia's economy, with less dependence on oil exports and
more emphasis on a strong manufacturing base[Ref. 70].
Thailand's future, like that of Malaysia and Indonesia,
seems to lie squarely in the path of economic advance and the
production of higher value-added, high productivity industries
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that appear destined to control the emerging information age.
Also like her ASEAN neighbors, Thailand is advancing in the
long shadow of the Japanese economy. For years Thailand's
most important bilateral economic relationship has been with
Japan, its largest foreign investor, aid donor, and trading
partner(Ref. 2: p. 209]. Thailand's Chulalongkorn University,
for example, is tripling its engineering faculty to produce
thousands more engineers, primarily for jobs in Japanese
factories around Bangkok[Ref. 67: p. 11].
But in 1991 the United States market surpassed the
Japanese and accounted for about 23 percent of Thailand's
exports, while Japan took in just over 17 percent of Thai
exports. Traditional Thai characteristics will make the
United States more valuable in the future. They include: an
unparalled cultural tolerance, which has helped Thailand
assimilate so smoothly both the ethnic Chinese minority and
the high levels of Japanese investment; personal friendliness
and gentility, which make the Thais such pleasant people to
work with; an innate love of learning, so prevalent throughout
Asia; a highly educated and discipline elite, who as
technocrats and business leaders have guided its political
economy so capably; a political system of "flexible
equilibrium"; and a history of siding with winners. The Thai
model should inspire the United States to expand its
activities in Malaysia and Indonesia. The United States is
the biggest investor in more than one Southeast Asian Nation.
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In Singapore, for example, US firms represent 18 billion
dollars in investments, much of it in high technology
industries (Singapore is the world's leading exporter of
computer hard-disk drives).[Ref. 67: p. 14]
Communism's decline has opened up large new markets in
China, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. True to form, the Japanese
are following a similar strategic economic blueprint to that
which so firmly established them in ASEAN. In Vietnam, for
example, a nation which expects sales of 80,000 cars annually
by 2005, Mitsubishi Motor Company submitted a "master plan" to
government officials on how to set up vehicle-assembly
factories and auto parts companies for the next 20 years. The
104 page report recommended a standard of manufacturing that
would give a dominating advantage to Japanese
companies.[Ref. 71] "It's like the prey of the black
widow spider," according to J. Malcom Dowling, an economist
with the Asian Development Bank in Manila, "by the time you
realize you're in the web, it's too late."[Ref. 67] Cambodia
and Laos with more recent economic reforms, however, offer
improved economic foundations and clean slates for
international investments. Last year alone, total exports
rose by 37 percent in Laos over the previous year. Foreign
investment in the local textile industry helped make garments
the country's top export.[Ref. 72]
America has a streak of isolationism in its history which
is a concern to Southeast Asians. It is combined with a
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tendency toward anti-intellectualism. Should this trend
surface, America's turning inward could hurt Southeast Asia at
precisely the time they expect the United States to keep its
enormous market open and remain receptive to exports from its
strategic allies. During the past thirty years Japan and the
newly industrialized countries have benefitted tremendously
from a strong and open American market.[Ref. 2: p. 36] The
United States will remain an economic player everywhere in the
world especially in the Asian region. Both Presidents Bush in
1991 and Clinton in 1993 made promotional swings through
Asia(Ref. 67: p. 14]. Moreover, during the 1993 Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation summit meeting in Seattle, President
Clinton commented that "We do not intend to bear the cost of
our military presence in Asia and the burdens of regional
leadership only to be shut out of the benefits of growth that
stability brings."[Ref. 73]
There are growing needs of national development which will
make the technology and markets of Japan and the United States
and possibly greater China more important than ever.
D. THE MEW MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE REGION
The end of the Cold War produced something closer to
geostrategic peace and a rush to cut military spending in
Europe, but it prompted new uncertainty and anxiety in
Southeast Asia - and set off a massive shopping spree for
arms. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the draw-
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down in the power of the United States, the nations of
Southeast Asia were less secure about who might attack them.
Who would protect them after the United States withdrew from
the Philippines in 1991 and further reduced military presence
in the region by greater than twenty five
percent(Ref. 74]? The booming economies in the
region allowed the nations of Southeast Asia capital enough to
buy a lot of firepower. In 1991 Southeast Asia accounted for
thirty five percent of all imports of major weapons, more than
any other region, including Europe and the Middle East. In
1990 the developing countries in the region accounted for
forty four percent of imports of major arms by all developing
states(Ref. 75].
The nations of Southeast Asia are engaged in accelerating
arms races with significant implications for regional and
international security. The nations of ASEAN, Taiwan, and the
PRC are all involved, but it is the emphasis on modern
weaponry, and the growing economic capabilities of those
nations to acquire advanced military hardware that sets this
arms buildup apart.[Ref. 76] An emphasis on naval
strength, rapidly improving domestic arms industries, and high
technology weaponry all characterize the Southeast Asian arms
race.
Of the nations in the region, only Vietnam appears to have
made any substantial cuts is defense expenditures. When Hanoi
announced its decision to finish its troop withdrawal from
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Cambodia by September 1989, it also announced plans to make
cuts to military personnel by 50 percent and reduce defense
expenditures to one percent of the nation's
GNP.[Ref. 77] For ASEAN, the trend is profoundly
opposite. In Thailand, the increase in defense spending in
1992 was 13.5 percent above 1991, 30.8 per cent over 1990 and
55 percent over 1989. Singapore's 1992 defence budget was
11.6 percent over expenditures in 1991, 20.3 per cent over
1990 and 40.9 percent over 1989. Malaysia spent 21.8 per cent
more on defense in 1992 than 1991 while the Indonesian budget
increased 14.1 percent over the same period. In the
Philippines, the defense budget rose 42.9 percent from 1989
until 1992.[Ref. 77]
The trend toward higher defense spending by ASEAN nations
is in large part an ambitious goal of modernization,
particularly with regard to air capabilities. Brunei, for
example is planning to purchase its first fixed wing aircraft.
The Royal Brunei Air Force will accept 16 Hawk fighter
aircraft from British Aerospace,[Ref. 78] while
Malaysia has ordered 28 of the British made
Hawks[Ref. 79]. The Philippine Air Force has begun
its modernization by purchasing 18 SIAI Marchetti S.211
trainer and light attack aircraft from Italy, 18 Kfir fighter
aircraft from Israel and 18 Albatross strike trainer aircraft
from the Czech and Slovak Republic(Ref. 77: p. 67]. Thailand
intends to purchase an additional squadron of F-16s[Ref. 79:
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p. 842] as well as three E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning
and Control aircraft from the United States[Ref. 79: p. 67].
The Singapore Air Force is the regions most advanced, and will
add to its strength with the purchase of another squadron of
American made F-16s and by upgrading the avionics of its older
A-4s(Ref. 79: p. 842].
In addition to the modernization of their air forces, the
nations of ASEAN are transforming their coastal or "brown
water" maritime forces into competent "green water" and "blue
water" navies with capabilities beyond their traditional
coastal defense. Indonesia, already in possession of the
largest navy in ASEAN, has started to take delivery of 37 ex-
East German Navy sips. The 37 ships represent over one third
of the former East German Navy, and are being received under
a deal signed with Germany in December, 1992. They include 16
"Parchim" class corvettes, 12 "Frosch I" and two "Frosch II"
class tank landing ships and nine "Kondor" class mine
countermeasures vessels.[Ref. 80] The purchase is a
means of expansion of Indonesia's naval forces at a relatively
modest cost, and is motivated by a desire to sharpen its image
and to strengthen its power projection
capability.[Ref. 81]
The only ASEAN nation with submarines, Indonesia is
attempting to acquire two more from Germany. Brunei will
acquire three 1,000 ton offshore patrol craft from Britain,
and three CN-235 maritime patrol aircraft from Indonesia. The
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Sultan may also decide to buy Indonesian made PB57 patrol
boats as well[Ref. 77: p. 67]. In an effort to protect
Filipino interests in its South China Sea Exclusive Economic
Zone, the Philippine government has increased the naval budget
by four-fold. New acquisitions will include three Australian-
built 30 knot, 57 meter patrol boats, 28 fast patrol boats
built in the United States; three 38 foot "Cormoran" type fast
patrol boats equipped with Exocet missiles from Spain; six
medium landing ships and four mine countermeasure
vessels.[Ref. 82] Malaysia is acquiring two 106
meter 2,200-ton guided missile frigates with the highly touted
"Seawolf" point defence missile system from Great Britain.
Moreover, the Malaysian Navy plans to acquire four Beech King
Air 200 maritime patrol aircraft[Ref. 83].
Singapore's Navy has completed the acquisition of six
"Victory" class corvettes built by Lurssen Werft of Germany
and Singapore Technologies.[Ref. 77: p. 68] Additionally,
Japan is building four more Aegis-class destroyers, plus a
fleet of modern frigates and submarines; Taiwan has ordered
six Lafayette class frigates from France and is building eight
smaller type of frigates from the United States.[Ref. 76: p.
139]
As evidence by these pui-hases, the arms buildup in the
region is characterized by a fundamental shift from
traditional warfare doctrines concentrating on self defense
during the Cold War, to an emphasis on power projection. The
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more modern capabilities and the ability to strike at targets
farther and farther away from home raise serious questions
about the rationale behind the arms race and the prospects for
continuation of current relationships.
1. Rationale Behind the Military Buildup in Southeast
Asia
Motivation for the arms race can be found in both
internal and external tensions in Southeast Asia. Some age-
old dormant tension between the member states of ASEAN have
reemerged with the end of the Cold War. Examples of such
latent anxiety may involve longstanding territorial disputes
including the Philippine claim to the Malaysian state of
Sabah, or the Horsburg Lighthouse between Singapore and
Malaysia, or the Sipadan and Ligitan islands between Indonesia
and Malaysia[Ref. 77: p. 68]. Some bilateral relationships in
ASEAN are flimsy at best, particularly between Singapore and
Malaysia. Likewise, Thailand cites a large Vietnamese
standing army as justification for its continuing arms
buildup[Ref. 76: p. 142].
The arms build up is also inextricably linked to the
rapid growth in economic power of the region. Fueled in most
cases by export-driven industrial strategy, these countries
have achieved impressive gains in GNP over the past two
decades, while the economies of most other nations have
declined[Ref. 76: p. 138]. The temptations to resort to
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military build ups for its economic advantages have not been
revisited.
To finance continued economic growth the nations of
Southeast Asia, with the exception of Singapore, extended
their territorial waters and their Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs) following their adoption of the provisions of the Law
of the Sea convention[Ref. 77: p. 68]. In many cases the EEZs
are overlapping and are contested. As a result there is a
high probability of more conflicts similar to that between
China and Vietnam.
The dangers of territorial disputes are greatest in
the South China Sea, particularly in the case of the Paracel
and Spratly archipelagos. As the threat from "communist"
insurgencies receded, particularly in Thailand, Indonesia and
Malaysia, the resources allocated to countering them could be
shifted elsewhere - hence the emphasis on air and naval
assets[Ref. 77: p. 68].
More rudimentary causes for the arms proliferation can
also be cited. The prominence of owning a modern weapon
system often motivates arms purchases. Competition between
the Thai armed forces, for example, explains a large part of
Thailand's defense acquisition program. In Thailand,
decisions regarding weapons procurement often reflect a
service chief's aspiration to be remembered for having
introduced an advanced weapon system.[Ref. 77: p. 68]
Competition between ASEAN states is also common. A good
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example is Malaysia's recent search for an advanced jet
fighter. In 1988 the Malaysian Air Force Chief of Staff
expressed concern that the Royal Malaysian Air Force lost the
advantage it had enjoyed for almost two decades in fighter
superiority over other ASEAN states.[Ref. 77] Thailand,
Singapore and Indonesia eclipsed the Malaysians with their
purchases of F-16 fighters from the United States.
Extra regional pressures, however, have played an even
greater role in the regional arms buildup. The widely
publicized Persian Gulf War demonstrated the superior
capabilities of modern weaponry, particularly from the United
States, even under extremely adverse
conditions[Ref. 84]. Hi-tech weapons became more
desirable, and so did the US presence in the region.
Despite the general agreement among the ASEAN states
over the need for a continued American presence, there are
still some doubts about the will of America to sustain a large
military presence in the long term, given the disappearance of
the Soviet threat, the U.S. military withdrawal from the
Philippines and domestic economic pressures in the United
States. These doubts fuelled the determination of the ASEAN
members to rely permanently upon their own resources.
One pessimistic scenario would see the U.S. military
presence substantially reduced by the late 1990s in both South
Korea and Japan. The center of gravity of the U.S. military
forces in the Pacific would shift to Hawaii, Alaska, and the
77
West Coast of the United States.(Ref. 85] Under this
scenario, China, Japan and even India seem likely to increase
their influence in the region[Ref. 85]. In this view it may
be argued that the military modernization efforts of the ASEAN
states are complementary, rather than competitive. Together
they could provide a strong unified defense.[Ref. 77: p. 68]
2. Prospects For the Continuation of the Arms Race
Between 1979 and 1989 the economies of the ASEAN
nations, the PRC, South Korea, and Taiwan grew at almost twice
the rate of their western counterparts. The economic engines
of the nations of Southeast Asia will continue to flourish and
thereby provide their governments with the assets to further
invest in their military infrastructures. To sustain their
economic growth into the 21st century many have invested in
the development of modern electronics, in conjunction with
communications and aerospace industries. While these
industries are intended primarily for civilian markets, they
do provide a high technology foundation for military
uses.[Ref. 76: p. 140]
All of the nations of Southeast Asia are now producers
of at least some military equipment, and most have invested
considerable resources in the establishment of new and modern
naval and aerospace production facilities. As a result these
countries are becoming increasingly self sufficient in the
production of advanced weapons systems. Indonesia, for
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example, has made a major investment in its shipbuilding
industry under the auspices of Dr. B.J. Habibie, Minister for
Research and Technology. Dr. Habibie, who was educated in the
United States, also plays a major role on the Ministry Council
for Strategic Industries which controls one of the most modern
shipyards in the world - PT PAL, in Surabaya.[Ref. 86] Under
the direction of Dr. Habibie, the Indonesian domestic
shipbuilding industry is being developed to fulfill
Indonesia's maritime requirements in the production of defense
equipment. Indonesian naval force modernization plans include
the production of twenty-two 2,800 ton patrol frigates, all
built by PT PAL.[Ref. 82: p. 56] The Indonesian shipyard is
also under contract to build vessels for Burnei, Malaysia, and
Thailand[Ref. 87].
To equip their new forces and to enhance the combat
capabilities of existing units, the nations of Southeast Asia
are buying significant quantities of modern weapons and
support systems. In Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
the Philippines, and Brunei total spending on imported arms
rose from an average of $2.5 billion per year in 1979-81 to
$4.6 billion in 1987-1989[Ref. 88]. More recent arms
import statistics are not yet available as of late 1993, but
media releases from the region suggest that the trend toward
ever-increasing levels of weapons spending has continued into
the 1990s[Ref. 76: p. 145].
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In summary, the economic means are increasingly
available to support the regional arms race; regional trends
in arms procurement from foreign sources and domestic
production are increasing; and the stimulus of inter and extra
regional pressures favoring arms build up are firmly in place.
E. THE ARISING TRANSHATIONAL PROBLEMS
Since the end of the Cold War, transnational dilemmas have
become the vanguard of Southeast Asian policy concerns.
Piracy, a growing drug cluture, population growth, and
environmental issues are more important than ever.
1. Piracy
Since at least the sixteenth century, piracy in
Southeast Asia has been endemic. Initially impoverished local
imhabitants took to pi. 'y in reaction to foreign control over
their economies. Today whole communities are involved, often
times claiming they have to rob to live.
Piracy in Southeast Asia has never been particularly
sophisticated. Most attacks are associated with petty theft.
In general, piracy has not taken the form of coordinated
attacks by large gangs on container vessels, prevalent in many
other parts of the world.
In an average scenario for an act of piracy in the
region, the pirates tend to operate in small groups of two to
five and typically approach their targets at night in fast
boats. They favor laden tankers and similar vessels with low
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freeboards which make them easy to board with grappling irons.
Ship speed does not seem to be a deterrent-many boardings are
on vessels moving at greater than 12 knots. In most cases the
pirates are totally unseen when boarding. Normally, they
quietly enter the cabins of crewmen-most often the master-tie
their victim up and rob him, then leave before anyone else on
board realises what is happening. The period of the attack is
generally about 20 minutes, as opposed to the average of
several days in pirate attacks off the west coast of Africa.
Pirates in Southeast Asia are usually armed, as in
days of old, with knives, cutlasses or sickles. On a few
occasions (10 percent of attacks, compared with a worldwide
average of 17 percent) they carry firearms.
In addition to the "traditional" form of piracy there
is another "piratic" threat to the maritime nations of the
region: maritime terrorism, or politically motivated piracy.
In contrast to pirating for private economic gain, maritime
terrorists strive to disrupt international shipping as an
effective tactic to further their political objectives. An
example are the Moslem rebels-known as ambuk pare ("Jump,
buddy") from an order involved with the separatist Moro
National Liberation Front.[Ref. 89: p. 17]
Relatively new concepts, including the introduction
of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), expanded territorial
seas, open registry of shipping, and post-colonial
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sensitivities regarding national sovereignty have had a
profound impact on the ability to prosecute pirates.
The areas around the Straits of Malacca have the
heaviest concentration of merchant shipping in the world,
which generally has to slow down in order to pass throuth
narrow channels. The Straits have been tratitionally plagued
by pirates.[Ref. 89]
The consequences of uncontrolled piracy in the Straits
region go beyond the potential for injury or loss of life to
ships'crews, and the economic losses associated with robbery.
A pirate attack frequently diverts the crew's attention from
the safe navigation of the vessel, thereby increasing the
likelihood of a grounding or collision. Therefore, the
potential for a major oil or hazardous chemical spill, or
blockage of the traffic lane, is a disturbing possibility.
The potential international ecological and economic
consequences from such a scenario are immense.[Ref. 90)
At issue is the international concern over the safety
of navigation in the Straits. Under the existing law,
however, only Indonesia is allowed to direct law enforcement
action against pirates in that most heavily traveled oceanic
passage, the Straits of Malacca.
Recent proposals garner a cautious optimism in the
fight against piracy in Southeast Asia. A regional conference
held in Malaysia in July in 1992 has resulted in the
establishment of a regional anti-piracy center. Financed by
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the international maritime community, the headquarters will be
located in Kuala Lumpur. The center was set up by the London
based International Maritime Bureau, and will function as a 24
hour coordination center to answer distress calls from ships.
It will collate information that could be used by Indonesian
law enforcement personnel to locate and prosecute
pirates.[Ref. 91]
2. Illicit Drugs
With growing economic affluence of the region, the
problems associated with illicit drugs also rise. Since the
closing years of the Cold War, drug traffickers have been
attempting to raise demand for cocaine, for example, in Japan,
the southern provinces of mainland China, and Southeast Asia.
Japanese prosperity and the growing prosperity of southern
China and Southeast Asian countries, particularly ASEAN,
attracted traffikers looking to expand their
markets.[Ref. 92]
Moreover, since the late 1980s, Southeast Asia
expanded as an exporter of illegal drugs to the world. Most
of the world's illicit opium cultivation took place in Burma,
Laos and Thailand(Ref. 92: p. 28]. Thailand bolstered its
position as the principal exit to the world market with the
export of large amounts of opiates destined for traditional
western locals, and increasingly toward Malaysia, Singapore,
and Hong Kong.[Ref. 92: p. 30]
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3. Demographics
Southeast Asia must also come to grips with the
explosion of population in the region. The demographic
challenge of how to handle an Asia forecast to surge in
population from 3.0 to 4.9 billion people over the next few
decades (to 2025) must move closer to the forefront of
regional concerns(Ref. 93]. The dangers of
overpopulation - increasing starvation and deprivation, mass
deaths through famine and disease, and a rending of the social
fabric[Ref. 94] - have historically been resolved
peacefully through migration, agricultural revolution, and
industrialization.
For example, the "green revolution" in Asia during the
1960s resulted in a new hyprid rice strain which is more
durable and produces much higher output - yielding two to
three times more than traditional varities of rice. Moreover,
because the new strains were made more readily available to
developing countries, the "Miracle Rice" was said to have
averted famines, weaned poor countries off dependence on
imported food, and provided political
stability.(Ref. 95]
Nevertheless, new scientific breakthroughs often
create structural problems of transferring their benefits from
the "haves" to the "have nots" within that region. Today's
Southeast Asia is presented with a larger challenge, as
advanced technologies threaten to undermine the economies of
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the developing societies. Population pressure is causing a
depletion of local agricultural resources (the deforestation
of Indonesia and Malayaia for the conversion to plantations to
produce teak, rubber, rice, coffee, and other agricultural
crops, for example). Therefore, Southeast Asians must keep in
mind the other possible consequences to rapid population
growth: internal unrest followed by external aggression.([Ref.
93: p. 13] The French Revolution and subsequent Napoleonic
France serves record that among the possible consequences of
rapid population growth, social turbulence and territorial
expansion are as plausible as any.[Ref. 93: p. 11]
Since the end of the Cold War, there now exist vast
nonmilitary threats to the safety and well-being of the
peoples of the region which deserve attention.
4. The Environment
Asia is home to more than half of the world's
population but just thirteen percent of the world's total land
mass. The governments of Southeast Asia recognizr the
significance of the balance between economic growth and che
environmental preservation as one of the critical long term
challenges facing the region.[Ref. 96] According to
Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew,
This is one world and if we destroy the environment,
whether political or physical, we are all destroyed. It
may take (the younger generation] 20 years to come to that
conclusion. I didn't come to that conclusion when I
started [my career]. I came to this realization as a
result of learning, stage by stage, as I peeled layer by
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layer off and came to the heart of the problem. This is
one world because, for the first time in the history of
men, technologically we are one interacting
world.[Ref. 97]
"Economic growth and environmental protection are no longer
viewed as contradictory goals," according to Tommy Koh,
Singapore's ambassador-at-large[Ref. 96].
Priorities, however, are different from country to
country. Japan and Singapore, which both have long-standing
environmental programmes, are trying to develop and make use
of environmentally friendly technology. Malaysia, Indonesia
and Vietnam have bolstered rules on tree felling and adopted
a firmer stance on the riddance of toxic wastes. At the same
time Thailand is trying to protect land from industrial
intrusion. The Philippines, on the other hand, became the
first country in Asia to establish a national Commission on
Sustainable Development, founded on the Earth Summit's Agenda
21 - an 800 page blueprint for incorporating environmental
protection initiatives into national development
programmes.[Ref. 96: p. 50] What defense has been to the
world's leaders for the past 40 years, the environment will be
for the next 40[Ref. 98].
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IV. CHANGES IN U.S. POLICIES TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA
A. MEETING GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES
In one of the most visible displays of global concerns by
the leading industrial nations in the world, the Group of
Seven at the annual meeting in Tokyo, expanded their
traditional focus on economics to include more security
issues. The annual summit, which included the leaders of the
seven leading industrialized nations (The United States,
Japan, Great Britain, France, Canada, Italy, and Germany), was
held from 7 to 9 July 1993[Ref. 99]. As much as
they tried to concentrate on economic issues, the world
leaders were pressed to deal with the new security dangers of
the post Cold War world - terrorism, ethnic wars, and nuclear
threats[Ref. 100].
The G-7 summit served notice that despite the end of the
Cold War - and in some cases because of it - potential crises
endure. Ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia, U.S./U.N.
intervention and clan warfare in Somalia, stability in the
Middle East, the restoration of the democratically elected
president in Haiti, the establishment of a constitution and an
elected Parliament in Russia, and the successful conclusion to
the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) were all issues crowding President Clinton's
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agenda in his first year in office. To further complicate
matters, in Asia and the Pacific, several possible flashpoints
exist: a new Korean war or a North Korean launch of nuclear
missiles; armed conflict between China and Taiwan; battles
over claims to the oil-rich Spratly Islands, particularly
between China and Vietnam; civil war in an Asian nation, such
as the Philippines; war between India and Pakistan, both able
to build nuclear weapons; and conflict between Japan and
Russia over the Kurile Islands[Ref. 41: p. 11].
However, it was a domestic recession and assurances by
candidate Clinton of domestic economic reform, more than an
emphasis on foreign affairs, that brought him to office in
early 1993. With President Clinton's inauguration, America
seemed destined to scale back its traditional role of
international leadership as it reasserted its traditional
dedication to self-interest. Most Americans were weary of the
commitments their nation had carried for more than forty years
and were ready to share their burdens with others. Burden-
sharing gained momentum in Congress, as members from both
parties lobbied for U.S. men and women in uniform to begin
coming home. They pushed for Europeans and Japanese to pay
for more of the expenses for those service members who
remained. Feeling hard-pressed financially, Americans were
less inclined to support more than their share of the
remaining Cold War military infrastructure, particularly in
Europe.[Ref. 101]
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During the Cold War, forward deployed U.S. forces in
Europe outnumbered those in Asia by 4 to 1. According to
present planning (1994), the ratio will soon be roughly equal,
with about 100,000 American military personnel in each part of
the world, despite the fact that Europe may be less stable now
than during the Cold War.[Ref. 102] Regardless of
the proportional distribution of troops in Europe and the
Pacific, the fact remains that Pacific based troops have been
reduced by over 30 percent. Moreover, the U.S.military budget
covering all services has been cut dramatically, and by every
indication will continue to be reduced. Unfortunately, those
reductions are occurring simultaneously with an increase of
U.S. national interests in Southeast Asia. Direct U.S.
investment in ASEAN in 1992, for exam ie, increased over 14
percent since 1991.[Ref. 103]
As the economies of Southeast Asia grow, and trade with
the United States flourishes, it follows that more and more
Americans will do business in the region. With the dramatic
reduction in the forward deployed American armed forces, the
United States will be less able to safeguard increasing
numbers of Americans living and working abroad.
With the dramatic reductions in our armed forces, both at
home and overseas, combined with a substantial number of
potential regional hot spots and increasing economic ties to
Southeast Asia, the responsibilities of the United States are
more difficult to meet. Therefore, American policy makers
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must constantly reappraise their responsibilities in Southeast
Asia in terms of global capabilities and commitments.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM SUBIC
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines left
wide ranging implications for both the United States and the
nations of Southeast Asia, including questions over continued
U.S. forward deployment; continued accessibility arrangements
in the region; and continued international military exercises.
What concerned Southeast Asians the most in the
withdrawal of the American military from the Philippines was
the strength of the U.S. commitment to the region. After the
U.S. Navy and Air Force withdrew from Luzon, forward-deployed
American forces in the Pacific declined by over 30 percent
from their peak during the Reagan administration. "We are not
sure ourselves where we are headed, so how can those Asian
countries be sure?" said Chong-Pin Lin, an American expert on
Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute. [Ref. 102]
President Clinton recognizes regional concerns and in his
trip through Asia in the summer of 1993 addressed some of the
Asian apprehensions. On several occasions he stated that
America's strategy will be "to compete, not retreat," - a
corollary derived from the fact that the United States will do
all it can to prevent East or Southeast Asia from falling prey
to turmoil and upheaval. Conflict and war, particularly a
protracted hot war, would retard, and perhaps even reverse,
90
the tremendous progress the region has made since the end of
World War II.
We think showing the flag of the United States contributes
to the stability of the region. The United States Navy
performs that function with the approval and support of many
Southeast Asians. "All of the other ASEAN nations have
intensified their bilateral relations with the United States."
according to Admiral Charles Larson, Commander-in-Chief of all
U.S. forces in the Pacific[Ref. 104]. The
strengthened bilateral relations of most of the Southeast
Asian nations attest to the fact that most want the U.S. Navy
to continue plying the sealanes. It also provides evidence
that the United States is considered a positive force in the
maintenance of regional progress and
stability.[Ref. 105]
Further attesting to the value of American forward
presence, Admiral Larson states that a greater reduction will
threaten vital economic and security interests in Asia:
An active and credible U.S. forward presence is the
cornerstone of future American Asian-Pacific security
strategy. Forward presence underscores the vitality of
existing U.S. alliances; it promotes new friendships as
host nations observe the benefits of training with U.S.
personnel in an atmosphere of trust and confidence; it
encourages and helps underwrite the stable geopolitical
climate necessary to promote economic growth; it assists
not only nation building efforts, but the promotion of
democracy, by providing a working example of the American
military's apolitical role; and it increases America's as
well as friendly states' military preparedness. Most
importantly, forward presence demonstrates on a daily
basis the continued U.S. commitment to remaining an Asian-
Pacific power.[Ref. 106]
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Moreover, the forward deployed American military presence is
heartily endorsed by both Seoul and Tokyo. Both have pledged
to increase their financial support for maintaining American
forces in their countries. Japan will pay 73 percent of the
cost, up from 60 percent today, and the Republic of Korea will
assume 30 percent of all won-based stationing costs by
1995.(Ref. 106]
In response to queries about the long term commitment of
forward deployed American forces, Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had this to say:
Of course, there are no guarantees one can give that there
won't be further draw-downs. We are in the process of
trying to rebuild the American economy. A strong economy
means we can maintain a strong defense effort.
Conversely, a weak economy will affect our defense effort.
Furthermore, there is no commitment the administration can
give about attitudes in Congress. But it is my impression
that there is a broad political consensus in our Congress
and the body politic that in this uncertain world as we
emerge from the Cold War, it is not prudent to dismantle
our forces or withdraw them in a precipitous manner from
Asia as we did in the wake of the Vietnam War, the Korean
War and World War II. There is now a much stronger
consensus in favor of sustaining an adequate, strong
military capability[Ref. 56].
If anything, the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines has
led to more visible support for a continued U.S. presence by
the other ASEAN nations. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia
have offered ship repair facilities, while training ranges
have been offered by Thailand, Malaysia, Australia and
Singapore. None of these are permanent bases like those at
Subic Bay or Cubi Point, "...but the facilities are welcome."
says Admiral Larson.[Ref. 104]
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one of the most valuable assets the U.S. forfeited in the
Philippines, and one of the most difficult capabilities to
replace, was the instrumented bombing range in Crow Valley.
Crow Valley was indispensable, for example, in naval battle
group preparation for the air campaign against Iraq during the
Persian Gulf War. Now, to attain the same level of
preparedness, battle groups must travel either to Alaska or to
Western Australia - hundreds of miles from the normal
operating areas of Pacific battle groups.
According to the 1992 Pentagon report to Congress, "The
Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim," the U.S. is
taking a new approach to regional access that will consist of
a network of bilateral arrangements that facilitate training,
exercises and interoperability which, in lieu of permanent
bases, will permit the U.S. to remain forward deployed in
Southeast Asia. The U.S. military posture will consist of
regional access, mutual training arrangements, periodic ship
visits, intelligence exchanges and professional military
education programs rather than permanently stationed forces.
"The lesson of Desert Storm is that the U.S. can project power
without bases, and that is the basis of bilateral access,"
according to Thomas McNaughen, Senior Fellow at the Brookings
Institution and a military specialist on
Asia.[Ref. 107] The U.S. Navy's objective has been
redefined as "places not bases."
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The United States is also pursuing bilateral relationships
for combined exercises. For example, Indonesia and the U.S.
conduct minor exercises at the component command level (ship
or squadron level rather than battle group or fleet level).
Most regional exercises are bilateral. The most extensive
exercise is the annual U.S.-Thailand "Cobra Gold" exercise,
involving all the U.S. services.
C. RESPONDING TO ON-GOING CHANGES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Southeast Asia is a dynamic region - always changing.
Yesterday's division into friendly and allied states, and
unfriendly states (China, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) is no
longer tenable. Our policies must be sufficiently flexible to
take account of on-going changes, without reference to which
states are "friendly" or "unfriendly" at any given moment.
Until recently, the Clinton Administration has declined to
lift the long standing ban on trade with Vietnam. It had
eased some of the sanctions, agreed to back international
loans for Hanoi and allowed U.S. companies to bid for
contracts financed by such loans[Ref. 108], but
normalization has been withheld because of animosity of war
veterans over the President's aversion to military service.
Though the President does not need the approval of Congress to
widen diplomatic or trade relations with Vietnam, he has tried
not to offend opponents of liberalized relations in the
legislature.
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As a candidate, President Clinton pledged there would be
no easing of the embargo until Hanoi makes a "full accounting"
of missing American servicemen. But that position was at odds
with the President's emphasis on expanding overseas trade to
improve the American economy.[Ref. 109] Once
elected, he stipulated that normalization would require
tangible progress by Vietnam in four areas - repatriating the
remains of American known to have died in Southeast Asia,
supplying documents that could help in the search, assisting
on cases where downed American airmen were suspected of being
alive but were not returned in the large-scale prisoner
release in 1973, and working with the Government of Laos to
determine what happened to American airmen who were downed in
that country.[Ref. 109: p. 5]
However, U.S. policymakers met in late December 1993 to
discuses a range of options, from partial abandonment of the
embargo, to a total lifting of the ban. They met after
Assistant Secretary of State for Asia, Winston Lord, returned
from a trip to Southeast Asia in mid-December with positive
reviews.[Ref. 109]
Assistant Secretary Lord made two trips to Vietnam in five
months and had nothing but praise for Vietnamese cooperation
on the issue of missing Americans. For their part, he
reported, Hanoi wanted to "proceed toward normalization as
soon as possible."[Ref. 109: p. 5] Finally, with the strong
support of Congress, President Clinton lifted the embargo with
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Vietnam in February 1994. The prospect for full normalization
lies immediately ahead. After Vietnam, the on - going changes
in Cambodia offered the next challenge to American policy
makers.
Cambodia offered the United Nations its largest
peacekeeping roll ever. An agreement endorsed by the United
States in Paris on 23 October 1991 was to create a "neutral
security and political environment in
Cambodia,"[Ref. 110] pending election of a new
government. The world could then redirect its attention to
other world trouble-spots. The Paris Agreement, however,
overlooked the nature of Cambodian politics and the apparently
irreconcilable aspirations of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, Son
Sann and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF),
Norodom Sihanouk and the Front Uni National Pour un Cambodge
Independant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif (FUNCINPEC) and
Hun Sen - despite their assurances to work together as
Cambodians. Cambodia was to be given something it has never
had and probably does not desire -
democracy.[Ref. 111]
The plan had two phases. The first was a Khmer Rouge and
the ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign military forces, and
their weapons and equipment. There was to be ongoing
verification that the antagonists did not return. The second
phase involved regrouping the majority of the opposing forces
into U.N.-supervised cantonments. Once in the cantonments,
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the forces would hand over their weapons to the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
UNTAC was headed by a Japanese named Yasushi Akashi, and
reached full strength of 16,000 in September 1992.[Ref. 111:
p. 115] Despite continued unanimous support for UNTAC by the
Security Council, several factors combined to make the Paris
Agreement difficult to enforce. Non compliance of the Paris
Agreement by the Khmer Rouge and the porous Cambodian border
(allowing the almost unabated flow of gems, timber, weapons,
money and people) were particularly disruptive.
Ironically, prior to United Nations involvement, the
nearest the Cambodian Civil War came to a solution was when
the Vietnamese drove the Khmer Rouge out and left Hun Sen in
charge. The U.N. intervention solved the international
complications caused by Hun Sen's ascendancy, but recreated
Cambodia's domestic political crisis by reintroducing Prince
Sihanouk, his sons, and the Khmer Rouge back into the
equation. The dilemma for the United States since the new
Constitution is whether or not to accede to the agreement to
let the Khmer Rouge participate in the government.
Aid and technical assistance from Japan and the West to
rebuild the economy will go a long way toward improving
Cambodian stability and the ideals delineated in the Paris
Agreement of 1991.
Some of the most dramatic changes to challenge the U.S. in
the region since the end of the Cold War have occurred in
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Laos. The political, economic, social and cultural changes of
the recent past have been unusual in a Confucian society with
its propensity for compromise and consensus.
Politically, the death of Kaysone Phomvihane, Secretary
General of the Lao Communist Party since its foundation in
1955 and head of the Lao Government since 1975, on 21 November
1992 represented an important transition of the old-guard
communist leadership. Yet before his death, even the old
communist leader recognized the rising democratic aspirations
of more liberal elements within the government and in Lao
society.[Ref. 112]
Conceding to the liberals, Kaysone was quoted as saying:
Enhancing democracy is both the pushing force and the
objective of our Party's all-round renovation. Enhancing
democracy is a long term process associated with the
growth rate of all sectors in the country, the level of
people's knowledge and the nations's historic features and
traditions. In the immediate future, the Party gives
importance to enhancing democracy in economic activities
and at the grass-roots level. Together with socio-
economic expansion, democracy in society must be widened
and enhanced step by step.[Ref. 113]
Devastating though Kaysone's death was to the very small
and close-knit circle of top communist leadership, it was not
unexpected. Government functions were not disrupted, and the
leadership transition was smooth. Nouhak Phoumsvan and
Khamtay Siphandon, the second and third highest ranking
members in the Politburo were quickly sworn in as President of
the State and Secretary General of the Party - two positions
concurrently held by Kaysone.[Ref. 112: p. 187] Kaysone's
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plan remained in effect - while the Party is prepared to make
concessions on the economic front there will be a much slower
transition to a freer political system.
The seven member Politburo (only three of which are
original members elected by the Second Party Congress in 1972)
recognized in the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc a
lesson to be learned. Moreover, the huge brand new and nearly
vacant Russian Embassy in Laos serves as evidence to Moscow's
drastic reassessment of key allies. Built for tens of
millions of U.S. dollars, the embassy and numerous other
buildings in other parts of Vientiane were intended to house
and serve a Soviet community of more than 1,000. Russians in
Laos in late 1993 number fewer than 200.[Ref. 114]
Lao reforms since the end of the Cold War involve
fundamentals of nation and economy-building. The country's
first constitution was published in 1991. Since then the
government has put in place a legal infrastructure, including
commercial, property and tax laws and allowed the
establishment of a central bank - all elements essential to
any modern society.[Ref. 115]
Privatization became a major cog in the new economic
engine of Laos. With the advice of the World Bank, in May
1991 a regulatory framework for public enterprise operations
was adopted. The vast majority of Laos' 600 state-owned
enterprises, all of which were badly managed and unprofitable,
were to be privatized. only Lao Electricity, National Water
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Company, Postal Service, National Printing House and three
others belonging to the Ministry of Defence were
exempted.[Ref. 112: p. 192] More recent reforms have
involved greater access to information. In 1992 international
direct dialling was allowed for telephone owners and private
facsimile machines permitted. Satellite television dishes and
foreign newspapers have put in an appearance. As a result the
1989 inflation rate of 85% went down to a healthy 6%, and GDP
growth in 1993 hit 7%.[Ref. 116]
Socially, recent domestic and foreign investment in health
care and education are expected to greatly improve mortality
and literacy rates over the next decade[Ref. 112: p. 194].
One of the key ingredients to the continued progress in
Laos is a strong relationship with Thailand. To land locked
Laos, Thailand represents not only a source of foreign
investment, but access to the west with all its benefits and
problems. Laos and Thailand share very close ethnic and
cultural links - their language is virtually the same.
Centuries of distrust between the two countries, however,
persisted through the Cold War, and were exacerbated by such
events as Thailand's closure in 1983 of the two countries'
border. The closure severed Laos' main trade route, and
resulted in bloody border clashes in 1988. Since the end of
the Cold War, however, Thai investment and most importantly,
the hand of friendship offered by Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej
and his family are helping to ease old
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animosities.[Ref. 117] In 1993, the Australian
built, recently opened Mitraphap bridge over the Mekong River
near the Laos capital Vientiane is the first modern road link
between Laos and Thailand. But the fundamental distrust
between Laos and Thais remains - the Laos want as little as
possible of Tailand's spiritual corruption.
In Novemer 1991 the United States announced its decision
to upgrade its mission in Vientiane to ambassadorial level in
1992 and in August 1992 the first U.S Ambassador officially
presented his credentials to the Lao President.
Perhaps the most significant on-going change in Southeast
Asia with which the U.S. must cope is occurring in Myanmar,
the former Union of Burma. Unlike Laos and Cambodia, Myanmar
remains a relatively closed society, though changes since the
end of the Cold War have been substantial. The changes have
been in a direction demanded by a strong handed government,
but also in line with government opponents. Of the four
recognized political forces in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw
(military), whose priority is the preservation of a unified
national state, remain dominant. The main issue is how
centralized the state should be. Democracy is not the first
priority, and is acceptable only if it facilitates or at least
does not hinder the attainment of government
objectives.[Ref. 118]
Economically, the Myanmar government has moved to give
more impetus to the economy through an increased roll for the
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private sector. Unfortunately, high inflation and limits to
the energy supply have remained major unresolved problems. in
1993 the GDP was down to a rate of 1.3 percent and declining
since a post Cold War high of 3.7% in 1989/90.[Ref. 118: p.
254]
The United States does not have much direct leverage
against the Myanmar military regime. Favoring a civilian
government, the U.S. attempted to prevail upon the ASEAN
nations to exert pressure. The request was met with
insistence by the ASEAN members on their common preference for
"constructive engagement," which gives preference to a more
quiet, reconciliatory diplomatic approach. Myanmar, however,
was not invited to attend the ASEAN foreign ministers'
conference that summer. Its attendance had the support of at
least two member countries, but was blocked by Malaysia.[Ref.
118: p. 263]
By way of summary, it is very evident that through the
period between the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region
in 1976 until the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia gave
every indication of being unstable. Due in large part to the
active interests of the three nations with the largest armed
forces in the world (the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and China),
combined with complex indigenous difficulties made Southeast
Asia one of the most volatile regions anywhere. Since the end
of the Cold War a large part of the volatility has disappeared
but the region remains as one of the world's great pressure
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points, and a region where continuing conflicts must be now
subordinated to cooperative efforts for progress and national
development.
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V. CHANGES IN JAPAN'S POLICIES TOWARD SHOTHEAST ASIA
A. GROWING JAPANESE AWARENESS OF THEIR GLOBAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
The Japanese are becoming more aware of their global
responsibilities so they must reassess the importance
Southeast Asia. Geographically, Southeast Asia is close to
Japan. Even from Co-Prosperity days, Japan looks at the
importance of Southeast Asia in much the same way we regard
the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America.
In the 1990s, Japan is emerging from the constraints of
the Cold War as the nation with the world's strongest and most
advanced manufacturing capability; the highest levels of
accumulated savings and capital formation; the best educated
work force, including the largest proportion of engineers; an
unusual reputation for close cooperation between government
and business; and a political economy well qualified to expand
beyond its shores.
The Cold War allowed the Japanese to galvanize their
national consciousness and forge a unity of purpose that
enabled them to win by economic means what they could not win
militarily in World War II. They were a major contributor to
the United States position in the bi-polar world, and helped
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create the multipolar world of geoeconomic reality that exists
today.
The story of Southeast Asia is a significant chapter in
modern Japanese history. With their own stellar example of
post war economic success, the Japanese established a role
model for the dynamic and immensely successful economies of
the Republic of Korea and Taiwan.
These two nations formed the core of a group called the
Little Dragons - South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong
- which mirrored Japan in many ways. Each is governed by an
authoritarian political structure. Each successfully unites
public with private sectors in pursuit of common economic
goals. Each possesses an outward orientation toward their
economy, producing quality manufactured exports. Each focuses
on the application of research and development of others
(usually the United States). Each adopted an industrial
policy that targeted strategic industries and shielded them in
their infancy from foreign competition. And above all, each
boasts a system of public education that has produced the best
educated human resources in the world(Ref. 119].
In response to a changing economic environment, Japan
expanded the sphere of its influence first into Indonesia,
Thailand, and Malaysia and then into the rest of Southeast
Asia. To the Japanese, these nations have become integral
cogs in Japan's industrial machine. They supply the lower
value components for Japan's own manufactured goods exports,
105
and also serve as launch pads for exports of indigenous
products manufactured with Japanese technology, and are
becoming dynamic, prosperous, rapidly growing markets of their
own.
Japanese policy makers are quick to point out that changes
since the end of the Cold War in the Asia-Pacific region have
been less prominent and slower to take hold than in Europe.
Moreover, defense officials recognize that despite the
formulation of the ASEAN Security Forum, there are no real
equivalents to the multinational security frameworks existing
in Europe, namely the Conference on Security and Cooperation
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "The continuation
of a security framework based on bilateral arrangements with
the United States seems to be appropriate for the foreseeable
future," according to the 1993 White Paper on Japanese
Defense.
In order to provide the appropriate response to the
continuous changes to international conditions, and taking
into account the downsizing of the JSDF, the Japanese Defense
Agency in reexamining the national defense capabilities. Many
anticipate that the a modification to the National Defense
Program Outline which prescribes the JSDF organization and
material provision among other things.
Regardless of the reexamination of the national defense,
however, "Japan's fundamental national defense platform
involves an on-going commitment to upgrading material to the
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level needed for the defense of the nation and also to uphold
the joint Japan-U.S. security arrangement and improvinq its
reliability."[Ref. 120]
B. CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES
The Japanese must continue to cooperate with the U.S. in
constructing the best military machine possible for
guaranteeing the security of Southeast Asia. They will keep
in mind the necessities for cooperation with the U.S., but
also to take care of themselves in event rifts occur in the
U.S. - Japanese policies.
1. The Post Cold War Significance of the Alliance
Though some would argue that the security relationship
between the United States and Japan appears to be shaky in the
absence of a Soviet threat to justify the U.S.
commitment[Ref. 121], Japanese policy statements
continue to stress the necessity of a close security alliance.
For the Japanese the alliance is critical to the security of
Japan and the stability of the Far East. Rooted in the 1960
Security Treaty, it provides not only a foundation for the
political and economic cooperation between Japan and the
United States, but the basis of Japanese
diplomacy.(Ref. 122] In a speech delivered to the
127th session of the National Diet in Tokyo, Prime Minister
Hosokawa stated,
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Close cooperation between Japan and the United States
centered on the Security Treaty is indispensable to world
peace and prosperity. I welcome the fact that the United
States has indicated its determination to maintain its
presence and to remain engaged in the Asia-Pacific region,
and I intend to make every effort to continue to forge
good , constructive relations with the United States as
the cornerstone of Japanese foreign
policy.[Ref. 123]
Recognizing the economic and political hurdles in a
continued military build-up, the Japanese "find it realistic
to ensure (their) security by forming an alliance with the
militarily powerful U.S. which shares the basic common value
and ideals called freedom and democracy."[Ref. 122: pp. 68-69]
In January 1992, the "Tokyo Declaration on the Japan-
U.S. Global Partnership," issued at a summit meeting between
the two heads of state, reaffirms the criticality of the
Japan-U.S. relationship to the security and stability of
Southeast Asia in the post Cold War. The Declaration states
that "...as countries with vital interests in the Asia-Pacific
region, Japan and the United States recognize the continuing
importance of the defense relationship to the peace and
stability of this vast and diverse region." Article VI of
the 1960 treaty is specific in granting the use of facilities
and areas in Japan for the purpose of contributing to the
security and international peace in the region[Ref. 29: p.
178].
Though the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty focuses on
security, it simultaneously provides a foundation for the
promotion of political and economic cooperation for the
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Japanese in Southeast Asia. "The maintenance of close,
amicable relations with the U.S. is vital to the development
and continued prosperity of Japan." according to the Japanese
Defense Agency[Ref. 122: p. 70].
Moreover, many Japanese maintain the conviction that
the Japan-U.S. security arrangements constitute the basis of
Japanese diplomacy:
To further promote a desirable political climate
developing in this part of the world in recent years,
it is needed for Japan to push dialogue with
neighboring countries, thereby positively cooperating
with them in fostering such a favorable development.
It is believed that the firm Japan-U.S. alliance
endorsed by the Japan-U.S. security arrangements will
play a key role in the direction of such efforts.[Ref.
2. Strengthening the Relationship
According to the JDA, "...at this time when the
international situation is going through dramatic changes
there is a need for Japan and the U.S. to avail themselves of
every opportunity to conduct closer dialogue to strengthen
mutual trust and cooperative relations."[Ref. 122: p. 71] To
that end, the Defense Agency outlines several means to enhance
the security relationship with the United States: encourage
the close exchange of views on security issues at the highest
levels; upgrade peacetime studies on the integration of the
JSDF and U.S. forces in the event of an "emergency"; increase
the number of combined military training exercises between the
two countries; further develop joint Research and Development
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projects; and assume a greater percentage of the financial
burden of U.S. forces in Japan. In addition to standard
diplomatic channels, the close personal exchange of views on
security issues between heads of state and senior officials go
a long way toward strengthening Japan-U.S. relations. In
November 1991 Secretary of Defense Cheney and his Japanese
counterpart met in Tokyo to reaffirm security relationship.
Their conversation centered on the rapidly changing events in
Europe and nuclear missile development in North Korea[Ref.
122: p. 72]. The meeting was followed by the summit between
President Bush and Prime Minister Miyazawa which likewise
emphasized the necessity of the union to the security of the
region in January 1992. Later, in July 1993, newly elected
President Clinton met with Prime Minister Miyazawa after the
G-7 summit in Tokyo where security issues crowded what was to
have been an economic conference[Ref. 124].
Availing the opportunity of the APEC summit in Seattle, the
President also met individually with new Prime Minister
Hosokawa. Hosokawa visited Washington in February, 1994 and
again let it be known that trade issues must not interfere
with the security relationship.
In order to ensure the effective fulfillment of the
Security Treaty obligations, the Japanese acknowledge the
necessity of close cooperation, particularly through studies
and consultations on the coordinated action of the SDF ad U.S.
forces. Based on the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense
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Cooperation," compiled in November 1978, future studies are to
address combined command, coordination, intelligence and
support activities. They will be designed to prevent
aggression in the region, and recommend action in the event of
an armed attack against Japan.(Ref. 122: p. 72]
Should the need arise, execution of the combined
defense planning will be enhanced through upgraded training
between the SDF and U.S. military forces. "Combined training
is indispensable from the standpoint of ensuring the smooth
conduct of Japan-U.S. coordinated actions." says the Japanese
Defense Agency. Furthermore, additional training exercises
add to the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements
and add a degree of deterrence against potential assailants.
The 1960 treaty stipulates that the two countries
cooperate with each other in maintaining and developing their
respective defense capabilities. The "Mutual Defense
Assistance agreement Between Japan and the United States"
provides the framework for cooperation in defense research and
development.[Ref. 122: p. 74]
The Japanese never felt as vulnerable to missile
attacks during the Cold War as they do in March, 1994. In
response to the threat from North Korea and the recent
successful firing of a medium range missile capable of
reaching the Japanese main islands, the Japanese have begun
discussing the joint development of a missile defense system.
The Theater Missile Defence (TMD) system would defeat the
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North Korean missiles with an anti-missile missile, similar to
the U.S. Patriot missile system which distinguished itself
during the Gulf War. However, there is concern in both
Washington and Tokyo that the project would aggravate
bilateral tensions in the same manner as the FSX in the
closing years of the Cold War[Ref. 125].
Nevertheless, the two countries continue to conduct a Systems
and Technology Forum to exchange views on equipment and
technology cooperation(Ref. 122: p. 75].
Finally, the Japanese have agreed to shoulder a larger
portion of the cost to support U.S. forces stationed in Japan.
The Japanese will assume payment for the construction of new
family housing and labor costs for Japanese employees working
on USFJ bases. Additionally, the Japanese government is
constructing replacement airfields on Iwojima and Miyakejima
islands for the Naval Air Station in Atsugi. The fact that
the Japanese economy has been in a recession for well over two
years highlights the strength of the Japanese commitment to a
continued U.S. presence.
C. CHANGES IN JAPANESE INTERNAL POLITICS
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a catalyst to a momentous
departure of the Japanese decision makers from their post war
inhibitions. Unlike the West, Japanese decision making
traditionally proceeds at an exceedingly slow and deliberate
pace. This apparent lethargy is due to two traits of Japanese
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society: the ingrained desire for broad consensus reached
through comprehensive participation, and the traditional
absence of commanding public leadership from the top
down.[Ref. 99] The perceived hesitancy, both on the domestic
and international fronts, of the Japanese government to
respond to the Gulf Crisis reflects the ambivalence of the
Japanese populace. But, the only legal means, by way of the
Constitution, for the Japanese to respond to the growing
sentiment for internationalization - that Japan must do more
internationally - was checkwriting diplomacy, that is spent
the money as means of meeting their presumed responsibilities.
The $13 billion raised by the Japanese for the Gulf War
was no small accomplishment. It was the fourth largest
contribution to the war effort behind the United States, Saudi
Arabia, and Kuwait. The amount was shouldered largely by
Japanese taxpayers through a tax hike adopted by the
government. Regardless of their efforts, the Japanese
received little international credit or recognition for their
efforts in return. In March 1991 two events served notice of
Japan's unpopularity in the United States and Kuwait. A
Washington Post - ABC News poll showed that 30 percent of
Americans said they had lost respect for Japan because of the
Gulf crisis. only 19 percent indicated that their respect for
Japan had increased. Shortly thereafter the Kuwaiti
government published a full-page advertisement in the New York
Times to thank members of the U.N. coalition for restoring
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Kuwaiti sovereignty. Japan was conspicuously absent from the
list of countries named in the advertisement. (Ref. 125: pp. 8-
9] On 26 April 1991, over two months after the conclusion
of hostilities against Iraq, and in possible violation of the
Japanese Constitution, the Japanese minesweeper flotilla
consisting of four minesweepers, a 'mothership" and a supply
ship set sail for the Persian Gulf. The Japanese legislature
chose to interpret a previously obscure article of the SDF Law
as legal provision for the deployment of the JSDF minesweeps.
In response to Constitutional arguments, Dietman Kanji
Kawasaki, speaking for the government, said "We have no choice
but to go by the argument that (the decision to deploy the
minesweepers is) unconstitutional, but
legal"[Ref. 126].
Surprisingly, in this first deployment of Japanese forces
overseas since World War II, the reaction of Southeast Asian
leaders was positive. Prime Minister Mahatir of Malaysia had
"no problems whatsoever" with the deployment. Similar
responses were received from the Sultan of Brunei and the Thai
Prime Minister. Only the Chinese Premier LI Peng showed
concern.[Ref. 127] The rapid mobilization of the
Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) represented an
attempt by the Japanese to prevent international isolation and
rejection and demonstrated the ease with which Japanese policy
makers can challenge constitutional constraints.
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After the deployment of the MSDF, it was only a matter of
time before the legislative process caught up with, the
dispatch of the Japanese military forces overseas. The
Japanese were rethinking their 45 year long absence from a
military role in world affairs.
D. THE EFFECTS OF THE CAMBODIAN EXPERIENCE
In September 1990 the first tangible evidence of that
rethinking came in the form of the U.N Peace Cooperation Bill
(UNPCB). The UNPCB was submitted to the Diet by Liberal
Democratic Party Prime Minister Kaifu for deliberation. The
Bill met strong resistance by opposition parties and on 8
November was defeated. Under intense international and
domestic pressure, newly installed Prime Minister Kiichi
Miyazawa made the second attempt with the submission of the
Peacekeeping Operations bill (PKO) to the Diet on 9 September
1991. The endorsement by the opposition Komeito and
Democratic Socialist parties ensured the eventual successes of
the measure, which passed by the House of Representatives on
3 December 1991.[Ref. 128] Success in the House of
Councilors, however, required a concentrated effort by all the
forces Prime Minister Miyazawa could bring to bear. Finally,
on the fifteenth of June 1992, the PKO bill was
passed.[Ref. 129] Prime Minister Miyazawa wasted no time and
began immediate preparations to send more Self Defense Forces
(SDF) overseas. On the second day of July, 1992, in fluent
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English, he delivered a 3,300 word speech in Washington with
an underlying message of greater military presence in the
region by stating, "not only do we intend to continue economic
cooperation, but we also hope to play a positive role in
promoting political stability."(Ref. 130] L at er
that month warships of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense
Force were dispatched on a "goodwill call" to several
Southeast Asian nations.[Ref. 131] Next, in August
1992, a twenty member mission comprised of SDF experts were
dispatched to Cambodia to prepare for the larger dispatch of
SDF forces in support of the United
Nations.(Ref. 132] The Japanese recognized the
value to be perceived in East and Southeast Asia as committed
to regional stability.
Two events in 1989 brought about a greater focus by the
Japanese on Cambodia; the end of the Cold War, and the
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. Spurred by the
prospects for greater economic opportunities with peace and
stability in Cambodia, Japanese foreign minister Taro Nakayama
visited Thailand and Malaysia in January 1990 for talks on
efforts to end the war.[Ref. 133] Continuing with
those objectives, Tokyo sponsored a two day meeting in June.
During the meeting in Tokyo plans were formulated for the
establishment of the Supreme National Council (SNC) in
Cambodia.
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The SNC was to be comprised of an equal number of
representatives from both the Hun Sen and Sihanouk factions.
But the third element required to negotiate a successful
ceasef ire agreement was missing. At the last moment the Khmer
Rouge boycotted the conference. Without the compliance by the
Khmer Rouge, and without a military force in place to backup
the agreement, the settlement lacked the muscle to enforce the
peace.[Ref. 134]
Nevertheless, the agreement made in Tokyo was considered
"a success by virtue of the establishment of the SNC. Later,
"a compromise was reached whereby all warring factions met in
Jakarta and approved the United Nations Security Council's
peace plan, under which the SNC delegated to the United
Nations the power necessary to ensure the implementation of
the agreement. It was a breakthrough in the sense that all of
the warring factions seemed satisfied with the new direction
of the negotiations.[Ref. 31, 114: p. 339] With what appeared
to be a satisfactory solution, it is ironic that the greatest
pressure for the Japanese to take up arms in support of the
Peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia came from the institution
(the UN) empowered with keeping the peace.
Prime Minister Miyazawa had this to say about the
deployment of SDF troops to Cambodia: "I want our nation's
contributions to maintaining peace to be widely understood
both at home and overseas."[Ref. 135] On the
eleventh of September 1992 Japan formally told the United
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Nations it would send a contingent of 683 personnel to join UN
peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. The peacekeeping team
was comprised of eight ceasefire monitors, 600 SDF engineers,
and 75 police.[Ref. 136]
Some Westerners and Asians are still concerned about the
political, diplomatic and military significance of Japan's new
PKO law. Most Asian governments regard the passage of the new
law and Japan's United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC) deployment with various degrees of
trepidation and concern. citizens groups in Asia tended to
react more stridently and negatively than their leaders. Only
Cambodia and Thailand welcomed the law and the SDF's new
mission. Cambodian leaders were grateful for the Japanese
financial aid which accompanied SDF personnel, and Thailand,
fearing that renewed fighting would send more Cambodian
refugees across the boxder, believed the SDF mission
facilitated UNTAC's success.[Ref. 137] But
historical factors also explained both Thai and Cambodian
dispositions. As previously noted, neither country suffered
greatly under Japan during World War II. They consequently do
not fear japanese aggression to the same degree that other
Asians do. Fears of theres were alleged when the Japanese
peace keepers returned to their homes immediatl after the UN
mission was completed.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the strongest criticism of
Japan's PKO law came from the two countries which suffered the
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most at the Japanese hands during World War II - Korea and
China. North Koreans viewed the law and subsequent SDF
Deployment as the fruition of its claims that Japanese desires
are to become a military superpower while the ruling
Democratic Liberal Party of South Korea said they felt "dread"
over the law. At the Japanese embassy in Seoul, Korean
students, housewives and war veterans burned Japanese flags.
Chen Luzhi, Chinese Secretary General for the National
Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation stated that China
"will not tolerate militarism by the Japanese, which will only
lead Japan to disaster."[Ref. 118: p. 127]
No government within Southeast Asia overtly rejected the
PKO law. Most generally expressed reservations or offered
only lukewarm support. Only under the auspices of the United
Nations did the law receive favorable reviews. Indonesian
response to Japanese legislation allowing the dispatch of
Japanese troops overseas came from Indonesian Foreign minister
Ali Alatas, who stated, "As long as they are sent under the
U.N. umbrella we have no objection whatsoever and we think
it's a good thing."[Ref. 138]
The news was likewise well received by former Singaporean
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew who voiced support for Japan's
participation in United Nations peace keeping operations, but
stressed that Tokyo should maintain its security alliance with
the United States. Lee warned Prime Minister Miyazawa that
altering the arrangement of Japan-U.S. security would be
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unwise. He emphasized the necessity for the United States to
preserve its role in the alliance as a necessity for regional
stability. Lee also suggested that Japan develop enduring
relations with China and strengthen its ties with Southeast
Asian countries. Lee further commented that after forty-seven
years since Tokyo's defeat in World War II, Japan remains
reluctant to acknowledge the extent of its past aggression and
should clearly accept responsibility.(Ref. 139]
Another view from Singapore was voiced by Singaporean Cabinet
Minister Brigadier General Yeo who announced:
Asian countries fear the bill may lead Japanese society in
the wrong direction and could lead down the slippery slope
toward militarism. In order to gain Asian trust, Japan
must practice a softer form of nationalism by re-
asianizing and forging closer cultural interaction with
East Asian nations. There was a time when Japanese
leaders thought it was better to de-Asianize and join the
West. While East Asia may find it very hard to accept a
militarily powerful Japan, East Asia can more readily
accept a politically influential Japan within the
framework of the United Nations.[Ref. 140]
In perhaps the strongest endorsement of Japan's overseas
peacekeeping role, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Ahmad
Badawi said it was about time that Japan, being an economic
super-power, played a role in the peacekeeping
process.[Ref. 141] A spokesman for the Aquino
government in the Philippines asserted that "there is very
little to fear about Japan returning as a military power," but
added that many Filipinos would continue to mistrust Japan's
intentions anyway. Several citizens groups in the region,
however, protested the peacekeeping law. The May First
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Movement, the largest leftist labor union in the Philippines,
for example, organized mass protests against it. In Malaysia,
a number of citizens groups also cited the danger of
aggression and demanded that Tokyo repeal the law.[Ref. 118:
p. 127]
The United States response to the Japanese PKO Law showed
little concern for Japanese militarism. While Prime Ministers
Kaifu and Miyazawa were working for passage of their
respective peacekeeping bills, Washington seemed more
concerned with applying constant pressure on the Japanese over
financial contributions to the war effort. However, when the
final version of the bill became law in June 1992, the US
Information service in Tokyo came forth with a written
statement:
We (the US) have refrained from any comment regarding the
internal debate within Japan... (the bill) was a matter for
the Japanese people to decide. The United States
Government welcomes this landmark legislation...this will
allow Japan to make further contributions to promoting
peace and stability...in cooperation with the UN. This
contributes to our global partnership.(Ref. 118: p. 128]
Far from apprehension over the law, the United Nations
encouraged an even stronger military role for the Japanese.
On the 15th of February 1993, four months after the deployment
of SDF personnel to Cambodia, UN Secretary General Butrus-
Ghali arrived in Japan to hold talks with Japanese Prime
Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe.
The primary focal issue of the Secretary General was the
persuasion of the Japanese leaders in favor of the concept of
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heavily armed "peace enforcement Forces". The efforts by the
Secretary General Butrus-Ghali were in response to repeated
cease-fire violations that could not be handled by the
original PKO efforts. His propos&. was to enforce the
ceasefire through the use of heavily armed forces, including
the Japanese SDF.
This in sharp contrast to the existing law which places
severe restrictions on the SDF. For example, when a member of
the SDF comes under attack, under current legislation, he must
first fire warning shots, then shoot only at the feet of the
attacking soldiers, and then fire only at their non-vital
areas. Prime Minister Miyazawa responded:
The United Nations has never adopted the idea of
organizing PEF units with heavy weapons as its own
responsibility. This issue must first be discussed...the
Japanese Constitution makes it impossible for the SDF to
participate.[Ref. 142]
This statement is ironic considering the disregard for the
Constitution by the LDP in passing the PKO law. Nonetheless,
the proposal by the Secretary General placed significant
pressure on the Japanese for a greater military presence in
the region.
The debate for the PEF concept was heightened on 8 April
1993 when a Japanese election supervisor with the United
Nations and his interpreter were killed while driving to the
provincial capital of Konpong in Cambodia. The supervisor,
Atshito Nakata, was killed a week after he first asked for
United Nations military protection which could not be provided
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by the Japanese forces.[Ref. 143] The killing
stiffened the resolve by the Japanese Government t9ward
maintaining a peacekeeping role in Cambodia, but did not
endorse armed intervention.
In January 1993, Prime Minister Miyazawa visited four
ASEAN countries in order to "think anew about how we should
shape the cooperation between Japan an the ASEAN countries
with the future of the Asia-Pacific region in mind, and about
the role Japan should play in this regard." In his speech the
Prime Minister stressed that regional flashpoints - such as
the Korean peninsula, Cambodia and the South China Sea - could
dramatically affect the security landscape of the region as a
whole. He identified the current "period of transition" for
the region, and the necessity to develop a long-term vision
regarding the future order of peace and security. "For this,
he stated, "various ideas should be thrashed out through a
security dialogue among the countries of the region." He
continued to emphasize that "Japan will actively take part in
such discussions".(Ref. 144]
The Japanase, however, had reached an age of uncertainty.
On 18 June 1993 two renowned members of the LDP joined non-LDP
politicians in a routine no-confidence vote against Prime
Minister Miyazawa. Four days later 44 LDP members resigned,
forming two new parties. On 28 July 1993, opposition leaders
from seven disparate parties announced that they had assembled
the votes to oust the governing LDP, which had been in power
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for 38 years.[Ref. 145] In August Prime Minister
Hosokawa assumed office of Prime Minister.
Hosokawa entered national politics early in 1992 when the
Japan New Party was formed and became prime minister in little
over one year. His ascendancy makes him different than
traditional Japanese leaders. The conventional modus-operandi
involved building a power base in a single constituency and
then accumulating seniority by holding various party and
government posts. Very few people supported Hosokawa when he
first announced his eligibility. Shortly, however, hundreds
of policy makers joined him and finally a large part of the
nation followed suit. In that respect Prime Minister Hosokawa
is the closest tning the Japanese have had to a U.S. style of
elected presiuent [Ref. 1461.
The new Prime Minister immediately began to address the
remaining barriers to a more constructive international role
by the Japanese. First, Prime Minister Hosokawa acknowledged,
after decades of denials by the LDP, that the Japanese
military forced Asian and European Women to work in army
brothels during World War II.[Ref. 147] Next, on
the 15th of August Prime Minister Hosokawa identified Japan as
the aggressor in World War II and offered condolences to other
nations' war victims. It was the 48th anniversary of Japan's
surrender. This statement combined with the admission by
lower house speaker Takako Doi that Japan caused "horrible
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sacrifices" for Asians contrasted dramatically with previous
LDP leaders about Japan's war role.[Ref. 148]
As with many of his predecessors, Prime Minister Hosokawa
recognizes the necessity of maintaining a strong bond with the
United States. Along with Prime Minister Miyazawa, he
recognizes the United States as the "cornerstone of Japanese
foreign policy."
Prime Minister Hosokawa, in his first news conference 10
August 1993, emphasized his eagerness to improve strained
relations with the United States. He expressed Japan's
concern over reducing the huge trade surplus with the U.S.,
but as with his predecessor rejected most of the "tools"
President Clinton has insisted on using to do the job - tax
cuts, targets for Japanese imports for
example.[Ref. 149] The Prime Minister indicated
that he was committed to change, but on a relatively narrow
range of issues, focused primarily on eliminating corruption
in Japan's electoral system. Overall his foreign policy and
economic ideas do not appear to be any more in harmony than
those of his predecessor.
With regards to Southeast Asia, he makes a point of
emphasizing a "modest demeanor and always working to foster
mutual trust, to make every possible contribution to the peace




The United States was the major provider for security
in Southeast Asia during the final years of the Cold War.
During that time members of ASEAN viewed the U.S. military
presence as the best hope for preventing war. After the U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam through the last years of the Carter
administration, there rose a fear of U.S. abandonment of the
region. The implications of "No More Vietnams" and the Nixon
Doctrine (stipulating nations in the region assume a greater
share of their security burden) were rather frightening.
Human rights became a front line issue, as it had never
before. Later, President Reagan restored regional confidence
in American military support through a stronger U.S. defense
posture and pronouncement of a hard-line foreign policy in the
face of continued Soviet expansion in the region, even if at
a high premium. Reagan was obliged to use deficit spending to
finance the defense build up, which contributed to the growing
Asian perception of a United States in decline. During the
Reagan years ASEAN was one of the "six pillars" in the U.S.
policy in Asia symbolizing the U.S. commitment to remain an
Asian-Pacific power.
Under U.S. pressure, Japan extended its maritime defense
zone from 200 nautical miles to 1,000 nautical miles thus
reaching to within 200 nautical miles of the Philippines.
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Despite the controversies between the United States and Japan,
including the Toshiba flare-up and the FSX controversy, Japan
was the chief supporter of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.
As of the present, the economic means are increasingly
available to support the regional arms race; regional trends
in arms procurement from foreign sources and domestic
production are increasing; and the stimulus of inter and extra
regional pressures favoring arms build up are firmly in
place. With the dramatic reductions in American armed forces,
both at home and over seas, combined with an alarming number
of potential regional hot spots and increasing economic ties
to Southeast Asia, the responsibilities of the United States
are if anything more difficult to meet. Therefore, American
policy makers must make a continuous reappraisal of Southeast
Asia in terms of global capabilities and commitments.
My conclusion is that it is clear that the roles of the
United States and Japan are vital to the welfare of Southeast
Asia and the peace of the Pacific. The U.S. - by virtue of
its military and economic strength will continue to play an
important role. It f llows almost automatically that Japan
will not presume to displace America or fill any vacuum that
might occur following decreased American participation; but
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